By Takeshi Hayashi (United Nations University Press) 1990.
The book under review analyzes the Japanese experience of development in technology which saw Japan transformed in the space of one century from an Agrarian, traditional society importing technology to a leading exporter of advanced technology. The author draws on the reports of more than 120 Japanese experts in various fields of industrial technology. This study is distinguished from most other recent Japanese studies because it looks at Japan as a developing nation and searches for elements of the Japanese experience which could be useful for currently developing nations as they plan their development strategies. Most recent Japanese scholarship has compared the Japanese experience with that of the West.
In reality the Japanese experience lies in between that of the West and those of the currently developing countries. Although much is made of the miracle of Japanese industrial and technological growth in the last forty years, the author stresses that Japan’s development experience began with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and to some extent even under the Tokugawas. Thus, the problems encountered, assistance available, and level of technology involved were all different from those of today. There are also many unique elements in Japan’s history for example, its status as a relatively small island nation with a well integrated population, its defeat in the Second World War which led to occupation and the implementation of thorough Agrarian reform by the occupying authorities, as well as a structuring of industrial restoration to suit the occupying power, and the advent of the Korean War which provided a sudden boost to the economy. The author is cognizant of all these factors and repeatedly stresses that each country must find its own way to development. Nevertheless, in his study of the Japanese experience he hopes to identify the key elements to its successful development which can then guide currently developing nations in determining how best they should proceed.
Another refreshing aspect of the book is the author's acknowledgement of the costs of development especially in the disruption of traditional Japanese society and in the burgeoning of pollution and occupational diseases. The Japanese experience is not presented as a golden example to be blindly copied, but as one previous experience with great success in some aspects but great costs in others. The author hopes that planners in other nations can benefit from knowledge of Japan's failures and still unresolved problems as much as from knowledge of its successes.
The book is divided into three parts. The first part gives an overview of Japan’s technological development since the Meiji Restoration and presents the author's theoretical framework. The second part contains case studies of the development of various sectors of Japanese industry and society. The author briefly surveys the development of urban society and agriculture and then reviews the development of the iron and steel, mining, transport, textile and small scale industries. Finally, he reviews the development of education, management, finance, general trading companies, industrial and economic policies, science and technology policy, female labour and pollution. The third part contains the author's conclusions.
The second part of the book suffers from trying to cover too much material in too little space. Each chapter, typically 5-10 pages long, is a terse summary of facts and figures in one sector with little attempt to relate the chapters to one another or to the theoretical framework developed in the first part. It would have been more useful to readers in developing countries to have an in-depth analysis of one or two related sectors, such as iron and steel and transport and their relation to the evolving educational and financial systems. As it is, the first and third parts of the book are likely to be of more interest to readers.
In looking at the possibilities for currently developing nations to draw upon the Japanese experience, the author repeatedly stresses the importance of each nation following its own path. Modern technologies are transferred but may not be easily integrated. Each nation must serve its current technological status and draw on the strengths of its traditional technologies and the skills and knowledge already present among its artisans and workers. He also stresses that technology in itself is not political, nor does a particular technology has value. It gains value only through its use. Thus, a more advanced design may be of less value to a society than a simpler one if the advanced design cannot be used or repaired in the given setting. For instance, a simple light-weight plastic pump may be of more value to a village than a heavier, stronger and more complex metal pump if the women who are the main users of the pump cannot manage the heavier pump or if repairs are difficult and delayed.
In looking at the Japanese experience, the author sees the emergence of a national consensus to abandon being an Agrarian society and pursue technological development in the 1860's largely in response to a perceived threat from the West. He believes that such a consensus is of prime importance for successful technological development. Development, causes and requires many changes in traditional values and society. Only a strong national consensus on the goal of development can guide the nation through the many conflicts caused by these changes. Japan already had a high degree of social integration by the beginning of the 1860's which greatly facilitated the formation of such a national consensus. But Japan is a relatively small and isolated nation and consensus is fairly and easily achieved. Perhaps as a result, consensus is highly valued in Japanese culture. It is a question for those from larger and more diverse nations whether such a consensus is necessary, possible, or desirable in their context. If consensus is deemed necessary, then developing nations today have in the electronic media a tool for forming consensus over a large area. But possibly in more diverse societies, consensus is not the key.
The author appears to be particularly fond of the number five. He has identified five periods in the post-war development of Japan, five components of technology and five stages toward technological self-reliance. In the case of the five components of technology the author concedes that two others: money and information are necessary but presumably they disrupt the symmetry of the paper and so are relegated to a later mention!
The five Ms of technology are:
1. Raw materials and resources including energy
2. Machines and equipment
3. Manpower including engineers and skilled workers
4. Management
5. Markets
All of the five Ms are essential for successful technological development. For instance, the most advanced machinery will not increase output if the raw materials are not supplied in time or if skilled workers are not available, to run and maintain the machine. In the field of manpower.the Japanese system is distinguished by the broad knowledge and active participation required of engineers. Engineers are actively involved in shop-floor management. Thus they are immediately available to sort out problems, improve daily operations, and instruct workers. In Japanese firms, engineers have a long tour of active involvement in all aspects of production, before they are assigned to design. Their status is not exalted, and they work closely with the workers. Further up the line, techno-scientists too, work closely with industry to apply their knowledge to concrete developments and are actively involved in training their successors and skilled workers.
Five stages can be identified on the road to technological self-reliance:
1. Acquisition of operational techniques
2. Maintenance of new machines and equipment
3. Repairs and minor modifications of foreign technologies and equipment
4. Designing and planning of complete systems
5. Domestic manufacture
The author states that complete self-reliance may be achieved only by following all these stages (though not necessarily always in the above order). He cites historians of technology and others to support the claim that there is no such thing as a leap of technology. However, a newcomer can carefully evaluate and choose sectors in which it has an advantage in order to economise on the time, money and effort spent at each stage.
Throughout the book, examples of these stages of development are cited. For instance, in 1910, Japan ordered locomotives of advanced specifications from Germany, USA and UK. On arrival, these locomotives were disassembled, each part measured and tested and then re-assembled. In short order, Japanese engineers were able to make a "dead-copy" of each locomotive. Next, the designs were adjusted to suit local manufacturing limitations and natural conditions in Japan. By 1923, Japan had commenced manufacture of completely new types of locomotives with a “reputation for outstanding design".
It is noted that technology transfer for developing countries today is more difficult than for Japan 50-100 years ago for two reasons. First, the technological gap between Japan and the West was much less than between developing and developed countries today. Second, modern machinery tends to be more "black-box" in nature, using a much greater range of materials such as exotic ceramics, plastics and alloys. The prevalence of electronics with Custom Integrated Circuits (ICs) and microprocessors exacerbates the problem. Thus, making a "dead-copy" in the first stage may require a substantial amount of supporting technology and expertise. These factors underline the necessity for judicious choice in technology transfer. The developing country needs to identify "enabling" technologies which are based on its traditional strengths and will give it a competitive advantage. These should be related to local needs, resources and capabilities. Linkages must be established with related industries and service sectors. Standardisation is crucial in any modern sector. However, blind adoption of often irrelevant international standards is to be avoided. Finally, the educational system must be geared to produce specific skills in the short-term, and to attain high standards at all levels in the long-term. Unfortunately, the choice of foreign technologies is often made by the political and administrative elite who favour the latest technology with little consideration of need or the capacity for technology absorption. This ensures that the country is permanently dependent on foreign technology.
In Japan, the government was involved mainly in heavy industry until World War II, leaving light industry exclusively to the private sector. Since the War, the government has concentrated primarily on setting policy. The author clearly favours private enterprises, citing examples of poor initial progress under State control with later rapid modernisation by private enterprises. This overlooks the many poor decisions, from the point of view of society at large, that have been made by private enterprises around the world, India included.
Lessons for India
While there are many lessons for India from the Japanese experience, the Japanese model cannot be transplanted lock, stock and barrel to India. The Japanese success was based on a number of pre-conditions and had severe social costs. Japan is a homogeneous society which has for long had a strong national consensus for development. India is a heterogeneous society with national consensus on almost no question. Much of Japan’s success can be attributed to a skilled workforce coupled with the willingness of management to listen to workers. Emulating this would require a substantial change in the Indian educational system. Education must be made more universal and directed towards skills needed for development. At the same time, the Japanese notion that status is based on accomplishments rather than merely on education is worthy of emulation by the label-conscious Indian student. (How many Indian engineers would be willing, as their Japanese counterparts, to start work with the same status and salary as a high school graduate?)
Successful technology transfer leading to self-reliance depends on the choice of technology that is in tune with indigenous capabilities. The use or neglect of such capabilities, especially in rural areas, will determine whether development benefits the entire population or merely the advanced countries and a local elite at the expense of the majority. Japan suffered from the disintegration of many villages as a result of urban-centred development. Japan, as other industrialised countries, has taken the route of initial development without regard to pollution and then faced the dual costs of clean-up and conversion of processes to less polluting ones. India has the opportunity to go directly to environmentally sound techniques.
Dr.P.T. Gonsalves
Dr.T.A.Gonsalves
Madras
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