TOWARDS AN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

There is an emerging critique of the Western Philosophy of Science and there can be two possible approaches towards evolving an Indian Philosophy - a moderate and a radical programme. While the radical programme calls for a review and change motivated at a deeper and political level, the moderate programme can be more readily spelt out and can be evolved starting from merely academic concerns. The current crisis in the modern Westem Philosophy of Science stems from what can be described as the virtual - “Collapse of Positivism” in recent years. Some of the salient features of positivism are as follows: 

1. The primacy of observation over theory 
2. Fact/value dichotomy - implying that science and technology are value neutral 
3. The cumulative nature of the growth of science
4. Understanding of science as a search for deductive explanations
5. Taking theory to be the unit of scientific practice

During the last several years there have been serious questions raised about every one of the above tenets not only from cultures and scientific paradigms different from the modem West but also by - “Anti-positivists” who constitute a sort of challenge to positivism though from within the Western civilisational framework. 

The evolution of an Indian philosophy of Science calls for efforts in several directions which would include 

(a) The elaboration of the idea of Sabda Pramana and its role in scientific knowledge 

(b) A re-examination of the reductionist viewpoints and concurrently an appreciation of the Indian effort in this area

(c) A re-examination of theories of causality - Indian effort in this area and the categories of Satkarya Vada and Asatkarya Vada have a very sophisticated understanding of these notions

(d) The critique of the concept of reason as has been prevalent currently in the west

(e) The study of the idea of universality from the point of the idea of Vyapti in the Nyaya school.

In this article which is exploratory, an attempt is made to seek some avenues for developing an Indian dimension to Philosophy of Science which is increasingly becoming a frontier area of Philosophical Research.

The Need for an Indian Philosophy of Science

It is becoming increasingly obvious that since the British conquest of our psyche down to the present day, the intellectual life of the country barring the interlude of the freedom struggle has been subject to a systematically increasing decadence resulting from most brazen parasitism. The condition of the intellectual life of a society always gets most palpably reflected in its philosophical activity. Without exaggeration one can say that the condition of philosophy is an index to the condition of the overall intellectual activity of a society. What goes in the name of philosophy in our country today, can be, by and large, said to be characterised by a cheap imitation resulting in a caricature of Western philosophy on the one hand and a ritualistic lip service to the Indian thought whose credibility is most often sought to be established in the Western eyes. Fortunately in recent years, these has emerged a mode of thinking which questions everything which was beyond question to India’s intellectual elite. Call it revival of Gandhi or whatever you like, everything of our national life - economy, polity, education, social institutions, art, literature, science, technology and most notably, our perception of our own past are questioned. Central to this emerging thinking is the idea that the need for freedom from the imperialism of the West over our psyche is axiomatic. In this paper, which is only exploratory, an attempt is made to seek some avenues for developing an Indian dimension to philosophy of science which is increasingly becoming a frontier area of philosophical research. The paper first seeks to establish the need for such a development and then attempts to discern some of the possible lines along which one can read the prospects of such an endeavour.

Before we take up the question "Why an Indian philosophy of Science?" let us look at the question "What should be the mode of philosophising in our context?" This question is important even from the relatively narrow point of view of worthwhile academics, let alone from that of broader and more fundamental civilizational concems. Given the indisputable fact that we have a long tradition of philosophy with a rich heterogeneity, imaginativeness and rigour and also, that we are exposed to the Western tradition of philosophy, how can we carve out the future of our philosophical practice? Thanks to the latter fact, our intellectual canvas is much wider than that of the Westerners whose knowledge of traditions of philosophy other than their own is apallingly poor. Even those Westerners who have endeavoured to understand Indian thought have failed to make their understanding part of their contemporary philosophical sensibilities and perceptions due to a wholly or mainly archaeological orientation of such an understanding. How can we make the best use of the width of our canvas? That is, how to assimilate the received Western philosophy and creatively link ourselves with our own philosophical past? We hear the talk of integrating or synthesising the Indian and Western traditions. But integrate and syntheses into what? Obviously the task needs an idiom of philosophising into which the received concepts and views from the West are expressed and evaluated. Such a background constituted by Western philosophy idiomatised through a hermaneutic violence, on the one hand, and the repository of arguments and views to be found in the Indian philosophical tradition on the other enables us to come out with wide-ranging and creative responses. It may be noted that the study of Indian philosophy must serve a two-fold purpose: it must, on the one hand, provide us repository of arguments and views to be utilised in our philosophising and on the other and more fundamentally, it should give us an idiom to frame in our own way the Western responses to the philosophical problems. Consequently our approach to the Western philosophy also shows a marked difference when compared to its present state. Firstly, it ceases to be mere reception and involves processing. Secondly, it involves much less information about Western thought than it is thought necessary to-day.

We shall now consider the question "Why an Indian philosophy of Science?" Though in different areas of philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language etc., Indian perspective has been developed quite effectively, such an attempt is yet to be made in the area of philosophy of science. Philosophy of Science has become a frontier area of research because certain lasting concerns of philosophical, especially epistemological, significance have received very sharp focus in contemporary philosophy of science. Hence an attempt to develop an Indian dimension to philosophy of science will enrich the Indian perspectives developed in various branches of philosophy.

Secondly, such an attempt if it succeeds, will explode the myth of Western philosophy’s unique possession of all capacity to provide terms and lines of development for the discipline of philosophy of science. Such a myth is on the verge of explosion in the contemporary Western philosophy of Science. However, it may be noted that one of the underlying reasons for the absence of any sustained attempt to develop an Indian perspective in philosophy of science is the belief, that both science and the philosophical reflection on science are somehow alien to our philosophical culture. They are believed as being exclusively the products of a revolutionary transformation in thought that occurred in Europe. Ridding oneself of such a belief is the first task facing the Indian intellectual to-day.

Thirdly, coupling of an Indian perspective with the prevalent Western one results in a binocular vision which provides a new depth to our understanding of the central issues of contemporary philosophy of science. This new depth should be traced not to any commonality between Indian and Western thought but to the philosophical gap that exists between them. This point can be better appreciated if an analogy is provided. Considering the question "What bonus or increment of knowing follows from combining information from two or more sources?" Gregory Bateson, the renowned anthropologist gives the illustration of the binocular vision. "What is gained by comparing the data collected by one eye with the data collected by the others? Typically both eyes are aimed at the same region of the surrounding universe, and this might seem to be a wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy indicates that very considerable advantage must accrue from this usage. The innervation of the two retinas and the creation at the optic chiasma of pathways for the redistribution of information is such an extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely denote great evolutionary advantage" (1). From such a binocular image produced by a wonderful process of a complex synthesis of information from two different sources, Bateson continues, "two sorts of advantage acrue. The seer is able to improve resolution at edges and contrasts, and better able to read when the print is small or the illumination poor. More important, information about depth is created. In more formal language, the difference between the information provided by the one retina and that provided by the other is itself information of a different logical type. From this sort of information, the seer adds an extra dimension to seeing (1). In principle, extra ‘depth’ in some metaphoric sense is to be expected whenever the information for the two descriptions is differently collected or differently coded (2).

In short, what gives depth to our binocular vision is not the structural identity of the two eyes but the gap that exists between them. Similarly, the binocular depth we get concerning the problems in philosophy of science by viewing them from the point of view of both the Western and the Indian traditions, is not due to their essential oneness but inherent distinctness not in their unity but in their specificity. The fact that the contemporary philosophy of science has called into question the fundamental commitments of the whole of modern epistemological tradition lends a great deal of significance to this new depth".

What is the attitude towards the classical Indian thought that we must adopt in our attempt to develop an Indian philosophy of Science? We must consider the Indian thought as one whole. That is to say, our focus of attention should be Indian Philosophy as a totality of certain significant philosophical views with a paraphernalia of well developed arguments and counter-arguments rather than a cluster of systems each set against the other. We must avoid the temptation to maintain the systemic consistency. This means that we must be free to accept the views belonging to different systems simultaneously. For example, one can accept the Buddhist theory of causality, Nyaya theory of knowledge, Sankhya theory of universals etc. One need not be a Buddhist through out, or a Niayayika through out or a Mimamsaka through out. In other words, to be non-scholastic, we must take the liberty to pick up anything from anywhere. What matters is the integrity of Indian philosophy as a whole and not of a particular systems of it. The Systemic Indian Philosophy which succeeded the pre-systemic stage has had its innings. The need to enter post-systemic stage can be fulfilled by our conscious efforts to cut across the systems.

We shall now look at some of the possible lines along which an Indian dimension to philosophy of science can be developed. If one looks at the vast literature of the subject of philosophy of science, one finds the absence of any consensus even on the fundamental question of the purpose and nature of the subject. The characterisation of the subjects which are broadly shared are highly inadequate. Thus for example, the characterisation of philosophy of science as a meta-level or second-order inquiry into the nature of science is too broad since even history of science and sociology of science can be considered to be meta-level or second-order inquiries into science since they too are "about" science. In order to avoid this fallacy of too wide a definition, another definition is offered, viz. that of philosophy of science as a conceptual inquiry. But this definition commits the fallacy of too narrow a definition since not all modes of doing philosophy of science can be characterised as conceptual. Such non-conceptual modes of practice were very much prevalent in the history of philosophy of science and even now are prevalent. When Locke or and Whitehead build an ontology on the basis of what he understood to be the implications of physics of their times or when Spencer constructed a social ontology on the basis of what he thought to be the implications of biology of his times, they were not engaged in a conceptual inquiry, but still were philosophising about the science of their times. Further, both definitions which in fact are loose and precise versions of the same conception of philosophy of science, fail to bring out in substantial terms the relation between science of philosophy of science.

Approaches to an Indian Philosophy of Science

It is contended here that a proper notion of the relation between the two and consequently an adequate definition of philosophy of science can be developed based on a distinction between "Vachyartha", "Lakshyartha" and "Vyangartha", so well worked out in Indian aesthetics. The considerations which lead one to such a proposal are many. With the collapse of positivism in philosophy of science a proximity between philosophy of science and aesthetics is established, (3) just as it has brought in, thanks to the efforts to Kuhn, the proximity between philosophy of science on the one hand and philosophy of language, history of science and sociology of science. Hence, the concepts and conceptual distinctions used by aesthetics can, in some way, illuminate the nature of philosophical discourse about science. The Indian insights in the field of aesthetics

Can be of much significance especially due to the fact that in India aesthetics has been for a long time inseparable from rhetoric (Alankara) and poetics (Kavya-Mimamsa). Since both art and science are creative endeavours (a fact to which only a lip service has been paid till now) their identity as well as their difference must be capable of being expressed through an analytical model.

When we are supposed to take what a sentence says literally, via, the literal meanings of the word and the relations between them, we are supposed to grasp Vachayartha. The mode by which a sentence expresses vachyartha is called Abhidhavrtti and the words used are called vachakas. But when we want say something tellingly or speak of what we see going beyond what meets the eye, it is necessary not to limit ourselves to vachyartha. Then what is supposed to be conveyed is Lakshyartha, the meaning of figurative language, as distinct from the meaning of literal language. The purpose of a craft, say literature or science, necessarily forces one to express Lakshyartha (though unfortunately some Indian aestheticians confine sastras or sciences to vachyartha only). Just as we can speak of Lakshyartha in the case of poetry, since it would be almost always absurd to go by the literal meaning of what a poet says, we can speak of Lakshyartha in the case of science where what is spoken of, most of the times are, ideal conditions or ideal entities. The linguistic act by which Lakshyartha is conveyed is called "Lakshanavrtti” and the words used are called "Lakshakas". A poet's or a literature’s success lies in using the most appropriate Lakshakas to convey the Lakshyartha. So is the case with a scientist. If one poet uses images, similes and metaphors, the scientist uses theoretical terms and models. In both case there is an attempt to transcend vachyartha. The distinction between ordinary and good poem is similar to the distinction of mere descriptive and explanatory science. The distinction is made on the basis of the absence or presence of lakshakas. Perhaps the only difference between the lakshyartha in poetry and lakshyartha in science is that in the latter it gets related via correspondence rules, to the statements which have only vachyarth i.e. those which are supposed to convey only literal meaning, (observation statements, low-level laws etc.) whereas such a relation is absent in the case of poetry.

However, a reader or a sahrdaya or a critic goes beyond lakshyartha and engages in interpreting it and finds "meanings” not pointed out by or not even conceived by the poet. These meanings are called "Suchyartha” or "Vyangyartha". The linguistic act performed is called "Vyanjanavrtti" and the words used are called "Vuanjakas”. The search of the critic is the search for "Vyangyarthas".

So also, the interpretative work of a philosopher of science is the search for vyangyarthas of what the scientists say or do. There is greater possibility for a fertile search for vyangyartha, if a work of poetry is a treasure house of Laksharthas. So also, there is greater scope for philosophising in the case of scientific creations which are highly theoretically charged. Similarly, just as the fundamental differences between the evaluations or literary interpretations are ultimately rooted in the literary samskaras or predisposition of the critics, the differences between various philosophers of science on fundamental issues are rooted in their philosophical predispositions. That is why the gap between philosophies of science, on fundamental issues, embody, as Kuhn recognises between his and Popper’s ways of looking at science, a gestalt one. Indian aestheticians also point out that if a vyangyartha or interpretative meaning appears to be more fundamental in terms of aesthetic beauty or range of perception than what is interpreted, it has ‘Dhvani’. But all vyangyarthas need not have dhvani. If a vyangyartha has dhvani, then it is called Apradhana Vyangyartha. The philosophers of science who tried to interpret science of their time as providing an ontology (as did Whitehead) or a social theory (as did some 19th century philosophers of science like Kant or Pearson who tried to evaluate the so-called pre-suppositions of science) attempted to come out with Pradhana Vyangyarthas. Positivism which Habermas rightly characterises as a "Scientific self-understanding of sciences” (4) attempted to establish that a genuine Vyangyartha of science must be an Apradhana Vyangyartha i.e. it should not involve"Dhvani" i.e. it should not go beyond what is interpreted. That is why, positivism is the reflection of science from within. The contemporary views in philosophy fall somewhere in the broad spectrum between the Pradhana Vyangyarthavada of traditional philosophy of science and Apradhana Vyangyarthavada of positivism.

Indian aestheticians also point out that the question whether what is called for, on a particular occasion, is Pradhana Vyangyartha or Apradhana Vyangyartha cannot be decided on objective criteria, but is left to the Sahrdayas themselves. So also, the dispute between immanent interpretationism of positivism and transcendental interpretationism of anti-positivism is fundamentally ideological i.e. rooted in the incommensurable pre-dispositions of the contending parties.

It may be questioned why all this use of concepts of Indian aesthetics to bring out the nature of philosophy of science and the main rivals in it. Why can we not simply say that philosophy of science is interpretation of Science and the rival parties differ in the mode of interpretation. Such a bland statement would have been guilty of not recognising the nature of philosophy of science as distinct from history of science and sociology of science, both of which also involve interpretation. Any worthwhile history has to involve an interpretation if it is to be more than mere cataloging of events and names. Sociology of science cannot even make a beginning without interpreting science as a social phenomenon and asserting that the story of science goes beyond the factors internal to science. That is why, the precise nature of the interpretational role of philosophy of science and its relation to science as well as the relation between science and other creative activities are sought to be expressed through an analytical model construed on the lines of an analogy whose terms are provided by Indian aesthetics.

On the Generation and Evaluation of Theories

We now see how Indian epistemology can shed light on one of the important problems that has been revived in recent times, (5) viz., "Is a logic of discovery possible? If so, what would it be like?" The pre-twentieth century philosophers who reflected on the method of science addressed themselves to two related problems:

(1) "How are the theories generated? (or what is the logic of discovery?)” and

(2) "How are the theories evaluated? (or what is the logic of evaluation?)"

Their ideal was to provide a theory which could answer both the questions simultaneously. Let us confine ourselves to the former question. The pre-twentieth century philosophers’ answers to the first question were consistent with their commitment to one of the two grand traditions of epistemology, viz Empiricism and Rationalism. In other words, their answer to the question "what is the logic of discovery?" was, in fact (they thought it must be), directly in line with or even followed from their position on the question, "What is the source of reliable knowledge- sense-experience or reason?" Popper who considered this question to be wrong-headed and authoritarian, contended that the central question of epistemology should be "Given anything to be the source of knowledge, how to check mistakes?" He thought that it followed from his above contention that the search for a logic of discovery was an ill-conceived search. Apart from the fact that the discovery process, involves non-cognitive factors unamendable to a rational treatment, such a search commits a genetic fallacy in that it attempts to account for the veracity of our knowledge-claims in terms of their genesis. He urged that philosophy of science should confine itself to the context of justification and leave the context of discovery to psychologists and others. As against this view, Hanson contended that philosophy of science must examine the context of discovery and unearth the patterns of thought that underlie the discovery-procedure. He insisted that the real or philosophically significant work in science, is over by the time the discovery is completed since the evaluation is only a pedestrian work. So, the question "Is a logic of discovery possible?" constitutes the Popper-Hanson controversy.

Since the emergence of Popper till recent times, Popper’s view prevailed and "the logic of discovery" was shelved. Very recently, "the logic of discovery" has been rediscovered and many philosophers of science, historians of science and even computer scientists and system theorists (like Herbert Simon) are attempting to provide "a logic of discovery" in however loose a form and thus establish the possibility (and actuality) of a logic of discovery. But the result is not at all encouraging. Laudan rightly traces the futility of these discussions to the failure on the part of these “logicians” of discovery to point out the epistemological significance of this problem (6). A question in philosophy of science such as "Is logic of discovery possible? If so, what would it be like?", in order to be significant must either

(1) be of heuristic importance in that it must provide ground rules for discoveries or

(2) must shed light on the nature of scientific knowledge and through that, on the nature of

knowledge in general.

The attempts of the pre-twentieth century philosophers who dealt with the problem of discovery aimed at both. Of course, they failed to do either of them but they did know what would give significance to their attempts. That they always had in front of their mind the second aim is clear from the fact that they discussed the problem on a broad epistemological backcloth whereas "The newest programme for the logic of discovery by' contrast, has yet to make clear what philosophical problems about science it is addressing”. (7).

It is contended here that the epistemological awareness of the pre-twentieth philosophers of science who dealt with this problem was a highly limited one. That is why, the current attempts even if they had followed the spirit of pre-twentieth century style of approach, could not have been better. In other words, the current attempts did not learn anything from the past because there was nothing much significant to learn since the epistemological framework which they inherited had no place for a question by relating itself to which the problem of discovery could have become significant. The central question by relating to which the problem of discovery could have become significant was never raised explicity in western epistemology and even when it was conceived it was identified with or subsummed under the question "what is the source of reliable knowledge?" That unasked central question is - “What is it that makes a true knowledge-claim true and a false one false?" Or, is the truth of a knowledge-claim inherent to the claim or on account of something external to it? Because this question was identified with the question of the source of knowledge, Popper could sabotage the case for logic of discovery.

Is the Validity of Knowledge Inherent to it?

In Indian epistemology, this question - whether the validity of knowledge is inherent to it or not - was raised explicitly and two broad answers are given to it. These answers are Svatahpramanyavada (“inherent validity of knowledge" view) and Paratahpramanyavada ("non-in-herent validity of knowledge" view). Note that this question is independent of the question “what is the source of knowledge?" This is made clear by the fact that the adherents of both views not only believe, (unlike Popper) in the legitimacy of talking about sources of knowledge, but also have almost the same answer to the question "what is or are the sources of reliable knowledge?” The answer "no" to the question “can there be a logic of discovery” supports Paratahpramanyarvada and the answer ‘yes’ supports Svatahpramanyavada. Those who say ‘yes’ and also work out an actual logic of discovery will not only support the latter view but can substantiate it concretely. It is in this way that the debate on the logic of discovery can have wider ramifications and gain significance and a sense of purpose. Thus the presence of the question "Is the validity of knowledge inherent to it or not?" - speaks of the wider canvas of the Indian epistemological problematics which can be used to place the debate on the logic of discovery in a proper light and context.

The width of the Indian epistemological canvas can be brought out in another equally significant way. To the question concerning the source of knowledge, Western epistemology has given answers which are dichotomous and single-valued. This is clear from the fact that the Western epistemological tradition is dominated either by empiricism or rationalism. The whole epistemological reflection was centered on a single question viz, what is the source of reliable knowledge and thus from the beginning the canvas was narrow. The canvas was further narrowed by

(a) Limiting the range of possibility to experience and reasoning and

(b) Viewing experience and reasoning as mutually incompatible.

Such a lay out characterised by mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive possibilities had an adverse effect on the development of epistemology and philosophy of science in particular. That is the reason why a view like Kuhn’s which is of seminal importance in contemporary thought and goes a long way in an attempt to properly understand the nature of scientific activity* could not find its moorings in the Western epistemological tradition. The inductivists can claim to be the heirs of the empiricist tradition. Popper who calls himself a critical rationalist can trace his views, in however a loose manner, to the rationalist tradition. Kuhn who could not find his epistemological moorings had to open himself to the charge of irrationalism and was literally goaded into sociologising the idea of scientific rationality. In all this, he was paying the price for the narrowness of the epistemological canvas of Western thought.

In contrast, Indian epistemology not only did not exercise a single-valued choice between sense-experience and inference, but also made room for more number of possible candidates to fill the place of the sources of reliable knowledge. Acceptance of Sabda as a pramana - either by subsumming it under inference as Buddhists and Vaisheshikas did, or granting it an autonomous status as others did, paved the way for a broader conception of rationality. The Mimamsakas are credited with a detailed work on Sabda as a Pramana. Let us overlook the fact that their work was directed towards establishing or defending the authority of the Vedas. Let as also overlook the fact that they did not succeed in that. What is important is that they attempted to do something which a work like Kuhn’s left to be done.

The significant contribution of Kuhn is not, as it is ordinarily understood, recognising a metaphysical element in the scientific activity. First of all such an element is only one layer in the whole texture of a paradigm. Secondly, the existence of the metaphysical care in and its significance for the scientific work has been pointed out by many even in the 20th century including and especially Alexandre Koyre, the father of the Modern French School of history of science to whom Kuhn is very much indebted. But what is or are novel in Kuhn are the other layers of paradigm which are neither metaphysical nor empirical statements or clusters of such statements, as well as his attempt to weave these layers together with the layer embodying the metaphysical core within a paradigmatic unity. These non-metaphysical layers are constituted by

(1) Model questions and model solutions provided by the paradigm as practical guidelines for normal science and

(2) The rules concerning strategies, techniques and procedures which are both prohibitive and promotive. They show the possible lines by procedure and limit the range of possibilities. In an extremely important paper written much after he wrote his classic - "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", he reconsiders his notion of paradigm to provide it the much demanded precision and elaboration (8). He defines ‘paradigm’ as the disciplinary matrix of a professional group. The two important constituents of this matrix are

(i) Models which provide the preferred analogy needed to give unitary perception very much required by the professional group and

(ii) Exemplars which are concrete problem solutions accepted by the group as paradigmatic.

Now note that what are important in a paradigm are

(1) The paradigm tells us what to do

(2) What has already been done and

(3) What can be expected to happen when we do what we are asked to do.

In all this, the point of central importance is that the injunctions amount to something qualitatively different from asking us to draw empirical consequences of the theory and verify or falsify them.

The Mimamsakas who have created a rich philosophy of language laboured hard to establish the credibility of Sabda as a pramana by working out their relation between the Sabdic assertion and the injunction that “follow” from it. (1) in the above i.e. what a paradigm tells us to do, in the language of the Mimamsakas, is ‘Vidhi'. (2) is siddhi and (3) is sadhya. Note also, that the assertive passage (arthavada) has no logical status independent of vidhi. The rationality of Sabda is thus based upon a logical relation between arthavada and vidhi which is itself inseparable from siddhi and sadhya. Therefore in a Kuhnian situation, we can argue on the lines of the Mimamsakas, that rationality does not consist simply in the practical activity but a logical relation between theory and injunction. Note that the demand here is to work out a logic into which both assertions and imperatives figure. Because the imperative and assertive constitute one whole - we cannot ask the proof, in any usual sense, for a paradigm. For after all, you cannot ask one to prove an imperative. To that extent the demand for a rational justification, as normally understood is shown to be illogical. Further, also note that the explication of the logical relation between assertive statements and imperative statements needs terms which contemporary logic is yet to be equipped with, wherein the concept of validity is defined either syntactically in which case a logistic system will be useless for any extra-logistic purpose or it is defined in terms of truth which is inapplicable to ‘vidhi’ statements.

The articulation of such terms will be a challenging task in philosophy of logic. Similarly, philosophy of language faces a new problem of working out a conception of meaning such that the meaning relation between two entirely different semantic entities viz, an assertion and an injunction can be explicited. In short, we have a new range of problems which have not been laid bare by the current discussion of rationality even in the sphere of philosophy of science. The recent work of some philosophers like Tolumin are encouraging and illuminating in connection with rationality and it is not all that incidental that these thinkers consider the Western notion of rationality to be highly parochial.

Induction: The Skeleton in the Cupboard of Western Philosophy

It is because Indian epistemologists did not confront their problems with dichotomous and single valued possibilities that their approach spared them from being bogged down in futile exercises. An example of this is their work in connection with the problem of induction. In the Western context, the problem of induction has been characterised as "the skeleton in the cupboard of philosophy". It owes its origin to Hume who showed that our theoretical knowledge as is best exemplified in science, has very precarious foundations since the principle of induction upon which the whole edifice of our knowledge is built stands unjustified. Positivists set themselves to achieve the task of showing that the whole edifice of our knowledge which is engendered by our use of the inductive principle has its foundations in the indubitable pure observations which can be shown to be related to the theoretical superstructure in certain specifiable ways. The whole programme fell apart like a house of cards for well known reasons. Popper claimed that he solved the problem of induction by showing that the unjustifiable principle of induction was never used in science which therefore stands exonerated. With the collapse of Popper’s model, the problem seems to have entered again. However, all these and other attempts are unconvincing, pretentious and even superfluous. Today it is realised that the problem of induction has its origin in a certain conception of the ideal of knowledge, viz. the deductive ideal of knowledge. This obsession with deductive ideal peculiar to the rationalists was imbibed by the empiricists like Hume. “Inside every empiricist there is a rationalist screaming for release and every rationalist is similarly haunted by an empiricist" (9). However, the attempts to solve this problem never seemed to say anything even remotely about the actual mode of scientific practice. The problem of induction, unlike any fruitful problem, could not fire the imagination of philosophers with regard to the actual method of science and throw up fresher and fresher problems. It appears that the posterity will definitely consider the mode of handling the problem and the pretentious attempts to solve or dissolve it to be scandals in the history of the subject.

On the Plurality of Causes: Divergent approaches of Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas

Let us see how a similar problem was handled by Indian thinkers. To the question whether to a given effect there can be more than one cause, the Mimamsakas answered in the affirmative and the Naiyayikas in the negative. The doctrine of the plurality of causes, so spiritedly defended by the Mimamsakas appeared to Naiyayikas to threaten the very possibility of inductive logic which had become synonymous with the Nyaya school itself. Naiyayikas faced the problem of how to establish the non-plurality of the causes i.e. how to show the casual leap to be justified. This problem is same as or similar to the problem of induction. Nyaya thinkers had to establish the justifiability of jumping from effect to cause by showing that there cannot be more than one cause. They showed that the apparent plurality of causes is due to the unqualified understanding or description of the effect, i.e. the more the effect comes to be qualified in description, the lesser the number of possible causes*. So, ultimately the ideal is the most qualified description of effect in order to hit at the cause.

Note here the freshness of the attempt to solve the problem which was on par with the problem of induction. The problem was not solved by resorting to the notion of pure observation but by invoking impurity of observations which means “qualifiedness", “complexity” in other words “theory-ladenness". Is it altogether unfamiliar to us that in science the accuracy of description of the effect involves more and more qualifying, complexity and therefore theory-laden terms such that we can make out the cause of a certain effect? Further, does not the attempt to increase the degree of qualification and therefore theoretically of the effect-description amount to a positive or incremental element very much required for a description of scientific work as it is normally understood and as has been shown by Kuhn and even Lakatos and for which there is no proper room either in repetition-obsessed verificationist model or refutation-obsessed falsificationist model? Is this not an important way in which theory and observation are brought as closely as possible which is one of the functions of normal science? (10). Of course, in practice it may not be possible to reach a stage where we can establish a one-to-one correspondence between a effect-description with a cent per cent qualification and the cause. But that does not matter. The problem of induction is a logical question and can be answered in terms of logical possibility. This logical possibility is not a trivial one since it is an operative ideal in our scientific activity.

Theory Vs. Reality: Lessons from an Ancient Indian Debate

I now briefly mention two more issues on which an Indian response can be developed. To-day, the case for realism in connection with the status of the theoretical entities has been convincingly established. But there is no satisfactory conception of the relation between the realism of the theoretical entities and the equally convincing realism of the ordinary physical objects. This problem is important for both philosophy of science and philosophy of perception. The attempt to reduce physical objects to the objects of physics is as questionable as the reduction of the theoretical entities to the physical objects as attempted by Carnap and others. So, the question is "which of the two worlds the day-to-day world of objects of ordinary perception and the world of the theoretical entities of physics is primarily real? If both are equally real, how can we reconcile them?" To-day this debate between scientism and physicalism continues to be bogged down in preliminaries. A similar debate took place in Indian philosophy between the Buddhists and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophers, both of whom were atomists. The Buddhists attempted to reduce the physical objects as are ordinarily conceived to the super-sensuous atoms, the non-reducible element being only subjective. The Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophers who were realists at all levels resisted such a move. But unlike the contemporary anti-reductionist or physicalists they did not reject the existence of the theoretical entities since they were atomists par excellence. They argued that the physical objects which are the ‘effects’ with the ultimate constituents of matter as their material cause constituted “avayavins" or “wholes” which are irreducible to the constituents. In other words, they endowed the physical objects with the unitary principle of ‘avayavin’, The Nyaya-Vaisheshika thinkers like Vatsyayana - the author of Nyaya Bhashya and Sridhara - the author of Nyaya Kandali came out with ingenious attempts to establish the objective credence of the principle of avayavin. The debate between the Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophers and the Buddhists who argued that the principle of avayavin is a figment of imagination or a subjective construct is an extremely interesting debate which can shed light on the question of the relation between the physical objects and the theoretical entities or the ultimate constituents of matter. Since the principle of avayavin is supposed to be embodied not only in the physical objects but also in all "effects", the debate can shed light on the reductionist vs. anti-reductionist controversy in the philosophy of biology. It is worth noting that the Nyaya-Vaisheshika view is not only anti-reductionist but also non-teleological, unlike Samkhya, in orientation. Most of the contemporary anti-reductionist views in philosophy of biology are teleological or teleonomic and for that very reason put off many people who are otherwise critical of reductionism.

With the collapse of positivism, the conception of one-to-one relation between theory and reality has been given up as being too simplistic. It is realised to-day that the way in which a theory fits reality is much more complicated. It is also realised that the theories are more like metaphors than straight-forward descriptions (11). Therefore in answering the question concerning the relation between theory and reality we can gain quite a lot if we understand how a metaphor fits a metaphorized situation. Indian aesthetics and philosophy of language have a great deal to say about the nature of metaphors or Rupakas. The attempt to articulate those insights into the necessary idiom goes a long way in offering plausible solutions to the problem of the relation between theory and reality.

I will end this paper by making a point which, I hope, is interesting from the point of view of the historiography of Indian science. It is rightly complained that the scientific tradition and philosophical tradition have not been brought close to each other such that a functional relation can be established between them. Here is a small attempt towards that direction.

The recent scholarship on Aristotle has brought out certain significant aspects of his works which were till now eclipsed by the customary and official interpretation of his works. The official view in a simplistic manner portrays Aristotle to be advocating a finalistic philosophy of scientific explanation which reduces everything to "matter" and "form" supposed to be his ultimate metaphysical principles. The official interpretation views his classification of the four causes in this light and attributes to him the view of primacy of final cause. The recent scholarship questions this interpretation. According to it, “matter” and "form" are concepts of reflection and not concepts of application. The concepts of reflection unlike those of application, are not themselves to be used for explanation but to be used to decide what type of concepts are allowed to be utilised for explanatory purposes, i.e. for constructing scientific theories. The selected candidates for the explanatory role are called concepts of application. In other words, concepts of reflection, which "matter" and "form" are, according to the new interpretation, are meta-abstractions. Similarly, the ‘telos’ in Aristotle, the new interpretation contends, does not stand for a unique cosmic principle to which all the explanatory concepts should ultimately be reduced, but is a concept of reflection which formally unites the four causes through the functional element, viz, the question "Why?" (12)

On the same lines, the categories of Nyaya-Vaisheshika can be taken to be concepts of reflection or meta-abstractions. They constitute the outerposts of a conceptual map through which the landscape was studied. They are the outer boundaries of a repository (of concepts) that supplied the needed concepts for explanatory purposes. Hiriyanna while discussing the various types of Gunas says: "It is not necessary to mention them all as their significance is more scientific than philosophical” (13). This can be said about not only the sub-categories of Guna but all categories and sub-categories in Nyaya-Vaisheshika systematics, In short, the scientific significance of the categories of Nyaya-Vaisheshika consist in their being the concepts of reflection that point to the possible candidates for explanatory role and weave those explanatory concepts into a formal unity. It may be noted that Nyaya-Vaisheshika has more proximity with Physical sciences whereas the Samkhya-Yoga has more proximity with biological and medical sciences - a fact very well reflected in their respective theories of causality. So the categories and sub-categories of Nyaya-Vaisheshika can be taken to be concepts of reflection for physical sciences in India and the categories, both main and evolved, of Samkhya-Yoga to be the concepts of reflection for biological and medical sciences. Since, among medical sciences, pathology and pharmacopoeia need both types of concepts of reflection, it will be interesting to know what type of paradigmatic amalgamation the Indian medical scientists carried out for themselves. This is perhaps one, perhaps a minor way, of "establishing the specific correlation of Indian philosophy and Indian Science".

Indian Philosophy of Science: Towards a Radical Approach

It must be acknowledged that there might be a more effective ways of developing Indian Philosophy of science than the one advocated here. It must even be confessed that the approach adopted here involves terms of the problematique, lines of exploration that are traceable mainly to the mode of philosophising about ‘Science and contemporary Western tradition’. To that extent it ceases to be "Indian" in a totally authentic sense. Hence, like many attempts of this sort, this too may not be a radical departure from the official line. After all, as Ashish Nandy points out, "To-day when ‘Westernization’ has become a pejorative word, there have appeared on the stage subtler and more sophisticated means of acculturation. They provide not merely models of conformity but also models of “official” dissent. It is possible today to be anti-colonial in a way which is specified and promoted by the modern worldview as ‘proper’, ‘sane’ and ‘rational’, Even when opposition, that dissent remains predictable and controlled. It is also possible to-day to opt for a non-West which itself is a construction of the West” (14). It may be that the image of Indian Philosophy of Science that emerges from an attempt like the present one is itself, at least partly, a construction of a mode of thinking totally rooted in the Western philosophical tradition. Hence, it is not altogether surprising if this paper is nothing more than an exercise in official dissent. 

The above steps can constitute the way for evolving a “moderate" approach to Indian Philosophy of Science. The “radical” aspect of it will perhaps have to be coupled with a political programme. It is possible to grasp the essence of Indianness directly by-passing "scholarship" was demonstrated amply by Mahatma Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi alone appears to have grasped the essential features of Indianness such as the absence of the notion of - "Universalism” in Indian thought. While Swami Vivekananda spoke about Vedanta as being "Universal religion" and Tagore wrote about "Universal man", Mahatma Gandhi had steered clear of these notions and the idea of Swadeshi that was central to his thinking appears to have captured the essence of Indianness.

Dr.S.G Kulkarni

Department of Philosophy

University of Hyderabad

Hyderabad

References

1. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity by Gregory Bateson, (Wildwood House Ltd, London) 1979, p. 69.
2. ibid., p.69-70.
3. On Aesthetics in Science (Ed) Judith Wechsler, (MIT Press) 1981.
4. Knowledge and Human Interests by Habermas, (Beacon Press) 1968 p.4.
5. Scientific Discovery: Case Studies and Scientific Discovery, Logic and Rationality (both Edited by) Thomas Nickles and D.Reidel, 1980.
6. Science and Hypothesis by D.Reidel, 1981.
7. tbid., p. 190.
8. Second Thoughts on paradigms: The Essential Tension - Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change by Thomas Kuhn (Univ.of Chicago Press) 1977.
9. Sensationalism and Scientific Explanation by Peter Alexander, (Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1963, p. 46.
10. "The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research" by Thomas Kuhn Op.Cit.
11. See in this context, "The Explanatory Function of Metaphor" by Mary Hesse, in -"Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science" (Ed.Y.Bare-Hillel.North Holland Pub.Co) 1965 and "Physics as Metaphor" by Roger Jones, (Sphere Books Ltd. London) 1983. It may also be noted that Ludwing Boltzmann who took cudgels on behalf of realism against the non-realism of the positivist Earnst Mach also considered theories to be metaphorical.
12. "Aristotle’s Physics and the Problem of Inquiring into Principles" and "The Problem of Teleology" (both) by W. Wieland in Articles on Aristotle, Vol.1 Science (Ed) Schofield J. Barnes and R.M. Sorabji (Gerald Duckworth and Co) 1975.
13. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, by Prof.Hiriyanna (Allen and Unwin, 1932) p. 232.
14. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism by Ashish Nandy (Oxford University Press, New Delhi) 1983, p.xii.