Showing posts with label Navjyoti Singh. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Navjyoti Singh. Show all posts

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS IN INDIA, CHINA, GREECE AND THE MODERN WEST

Since ancient times all civilizations have had an understanding of mathematics as a rigorous discipline. However different civilizations have shown different inclinations in their mathematical efforts and consequently the content of mathematics practiced in them was different. We would examine the development of mathematics in India, China, and Greece and in the modern West. The emphasis of the study will largely be on the history of concept formation in the realm of mathematics and the underlying philosophical inclinations.

The comparative study of mathematical development in different civilisations shows strikingly distinct paths in their growth or content. Mathematics in India and China showed an algebraic inclination, in contrast to mathematics of Greece which was geometric in its outlook.1 This difference is not just an apparent difference, but is one which pervades even the foundational realm of mathematics and indicates fundamental differences in the paths of development of mathematics. Another significant difference in the methodology of mathematics of these civilizations is that the so called 'method of indirect proof was not accepted in India and China whereas this method was central to Greek efforts.2 Though demonstrative reasoning was in practice in mathematical efforts of all the civilizations the notion of indirect proof, which led to emergence of a peculiar kind of formal logic, was there only in Greek mathematics. Whereas Indians and Greeks paid early and detailed attention to formal logic, the Chinese showed a constant tendency to develop "dialectical logic". Even the formal logical systems developed in India and Greece were entirely different. The Indian logic was structured as an important component of the Indian epistemological analysis and was therefore formal as well as material, deductive as well as inductive. Dasgupta has conjectured that Nyaya logic developed out of medical and linguistic debates. In India, logic seems to have had not much relation with mathematical debates. On the other hand, logic in Greece (as well as in the Modern West) is closely tied with modes of mathematical reasoning. In fact the importance of mathematics to Greek philosophy3 can be accessed from Plato’s attitude towards the knowledge body of his times given in Republic and Timoeus. Knowledge bodies in descending order of importance for him ware Arithmetic, Plane geometry, Solid geometry, Astronomy and Harmonics.

In this study, we shall try to bring out the basic differences in the cognitive structure of mathematics as practiced in the Greek, Chinese and Indian civilizations — differences in their ontological conceptions regarding existence and. nature of mathematical objects and methodological conceptions regarding nature and ways of [establishing mathematical truths. The, differences in cognitive structure of mathematics as practiced in the various civilizations pose many complex problems which call for a closer study of mathematics developed by these civilizations. 'Also the differences in the mathematics of these civilizations have to be identified in a more exhaustive way and can probably be attributed to the differences in the worldviews t prevalent in them, as development of mathematics and its content cannot be seen in isolation" from the general history of the modes of understanding. The modes' of understandings find their overt expression in the philosophical schools of the time and their debates, which influence even the process of concept formation in mathematics. In this paper, we will try to comprehend the plurality of directions of concept formation in mathematics along with their underlying philosophical bases and also try to relate them to some of the philosophical problems of the modern mathematics of the West.

(1)


Greek (mathematics flourished between 6th century BC (Thales: 639-546 BC) and survived till the Ptolemaic dynasty of Egypt. It can doubtlessly be asserted that Greek mathematical tradition drew from achievements of ancient Babylonians and also probably the Egyptian tradition. But the concepts used in Greek mathematics were fundamentally different from those used in Babylonian and Egyptian mathematics and were marked by their philosophical inclination towards anti-empiricism.4

In Greece, the rise of Pythagorean mysticism played a pioneering role in the development of mathematics. ‘Pythagorean experiments with the strings of different lengths led jto the discovery of arithmetic ratio ability of musical notes. This discovery was instrumental in the formulation of Greek theory of proportion. Ratio (logos) 'was understood as the relation between the strings of different lengths represented by two numbers and was equivalent to relation between two lines in terms of their number measure. Greek understanding of the realm of mathematics through peculiar equivalence of geometry and arithmetic’s stems from this principle. For them, measurableness was the root from which countableness stems. Consequently number had a figurative quality. Classification of numbers as plane numbers, similar plane numbers and their further division into square number, rectangular number, triangular number, and pentagonal number finally led to the understanding of realm of numbers as assemblage of classes or species (eidos) of numbers that forms the realm of arithmos. The important point to note here is that number was seen in accord with its measurableness which is essentially a demand posed by the geometric view. Commensurability with geometric unit line was the fundamental criterion for the constitution of the realm of arithmos. Instead of fraction which divides the unit line, concept of ratio was used which transforms fraction into relation of two commensurable complete measures or numbers. Significant trait of Pythagoreanism was its atomistic outlook which remained integral with the rest of Greek mathematics as well. Number was an entity constituted out of an indivisible unit which was understood as in itself monad, as purely abstract and as primordial atom. The fundamental doctrine of Pythagoreanism, the dependence of musical consonances on arithmos5 was not only responsible for formulation of Greek mathematics but also its ontology. The Greeks imagined that the world and its bodies had been built, “out of numbers".

But soon in the realm of arithmos, they came across lengths which were incommensurable when determining the mean proportion of the two side6 of a rectangle which is needed for squaring the rectangle. Even the diagonal of a unit square (= √2) is incommensurable and this discovery was a great scandal for the school of Pythagorean thinkers. As the story goes a pupil of Pythagoras, Hippasus of Metapontum is said to have perished at sea for the rebellious act of disclosing the discovery of incommensurability. Memory of this scandal is retained even in the terminology of modern mathematics. Numbers which are expressible as a ratio of two integers are called rational numbers, whereas numbers like length of a diagonal of a unit square i.e. √2, are not expressible as ratio and hence are called irrational, as Greeks called them, because they were "un-ratio-able". It is an interesting fact that the etymological root of rationalism comes from Latin ratio which is a translation of Greek logos meaning mathematical ratio and which to Greeks, because of its elegance, symbolized reason itself. Corning back to the main point, Greek incommensurability was the result of an attempt to establish equivalence of geometry with arithmetic—it was the result of geometric view of irrationality of numbers. Because of the geometric bias Greeks just did not recognize irrational numbers as numbers and consequently the discipline of numbers was reduced to narrow realm thus robbing away considerable potency of arithmetic’s.

Another significant philosophical movement, which was destined to have lasting effect on Greek mathematics, was the teachings of the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras and his pupil Zeno. They believed that Truth cannot be grasped by means of sense perception but only by reason logo. | They hypothesized on ontological realm of static where there is no motion, no change, no becoming, no perishing, no space and no time. This realm, they believed, was accessible to man by reason- To prove the existence of this realm they devised the rational method of reduction ad absurdum. Zeno's famous paradoxes deny motion, space1 and time by using this method. A salient feature of the method used is the acceptance of singular negation of statement so that statement and its negation give mutually exclusive non-interpenetrating hypothetical existence. True existence of any statement, can be demonstrated if the existence of its negation can be denied and fit can be denied by showing logical inconsistencies, which follow |if the negation is assumed to be true.6 This method opens up a realm, whose, existence is solely demonstrated on 'the ground that its negation is inconsistent. [Realm of existence, which thus opens up, is an ideal realm as it is not arrived at through its empirical accessibility, but through a particular ideation procedure. Here, we see the radical anti-empicsm of Eleatic philosophy. Rejection of empiricism in Greek mathematics after Pythagoras can be attributed to the decisive influence of Eleatic School of philosophy. Though Eleatic philosophers had very little to do with mathematics) directly, still the method they evolved from purely philosophical) arguments played a decisive roie in further evolution of Greek mathematics and is also central to modern mathematics.7

Two centuries later in Euclid's Elements we find complete internalization of Eleatic tradition within mathematics. There was one fundamental tension between Eleatics and Pythagoreans which posed considerable problem for attempting synthesis. That was the preoccupation of Pythagoreans with a conception of space, which is sensuous in orgin. For Pythagoreans number not only had relation with space but also with "material". Eleatic philosophers on the other hand denied being for space. This apparent irreconcilable nature of Pythagorean and Eleatic position was reconciled by Platonic synthesis which climaxed in Euclid. Plato's philosophy (427-347 BC) was influenced by Pythagorean mathematics as well as by Eleatic philosophy. Plato inherited from Eleatics the distrust for sensuous which he readily equated with the realm of changing opinion, the realm of impermanence, the realm of becoming and the realm of things in flux. Plato assigns to 'mathematical' a totally different mode of being than Pythagoreans. Numbers for Plato were separable from the object of senses, so that they appear alongside perceptible things as a separate realm of being. The counting of objects of senses was grounded in the existence of non-sensible idea of number. The difference between counting and the science of numbers was one of the fundamental- doctrines of Platonism. The possibility of calculations was rooted in certain immutable characteristics of the numbers themselves and it is with them that arithmos deals. The immediate consequence of this doctrine, at least within Platonic tradition, was the exclusion of all compu-tational problems from the realm of the pure science of arithmos. Science of arithmos in ideal form was already quite developed by the -time of Plato that is way Plato had good reason to regard arithmetic as the finest science of his time.

It was with the conception of space in Geometry that Plato had problems. Awareness of space is associated with location of things which move, change, are generated and destroyed in it and it was this Plato wanted to avoid. The attempt to develop an extra-sensory conception of space marked the beginning of theoretical geometry in Greece. Plato believed that space is apprehensible not by sense perception but by a kind of "bastard reasoning".8 On the one hand, it was eternal and indestructible, and on the other it was intimately bound up with the phenomenon of the perceptible world. For Plato, the aim of geometry should be to gain knowledge of eternal reality. Arithmetic was based on 'one', its multitude ratios, etc. These were ideal and completely abstract forms and were well suited for Platonic ethos. There was, however, no such ideal starting point for geometry. Hence the idealization of geometry, which was demanded by Platonic connections needed different logical structure than that of Pythagorean arithmetic. It was here that Eleatic method entered into mathematics. Formulation of axiomatic foundation of geometry was a result of Platonic tradition which culminated in Euclid.

In Euclid's Elements forms of geometry (lines points of intersection, angle, figures etc.) were ideal entities whose visible counter-parts served only to represent them. The definitions were intended to eliminate as many sensible features as possible from geometry the axioms and postulates were also aimed at making the foundations of this science purely abstract. Euclid defined a point as that which has no part" and a line as "breathless length". Euclid avoided any mention of motion unlike Proclus who defined line as "uniform" and "undeviating flowing of a point". Here we see that temporality is being avoided. What was sought was the realm of ideas in itself whose simplicity, consistency and beauty was the sole reason for their truth-fullness. This realm of ideas was the true realm of being. Properties of this realm were explored using Eleatic method, which enables demonstration of existence of properties of idea forms by denying consistency of their negation. To develop science of these ideal forms was the self-imposed task of Euclid.

From Plutarch, we know that for Euclid the finest task of his geometry was to be able to explain and investigate Platonic solids. Platonic solids were elemental ideal objects which played j a central role In his cosmology. He thought that distinctiveness of four fundamental elements drew out of the underlying four regular ideal solids: earth-cube (because cube is a most stable solid), fire-pyramid (because fire rises up as symbolized [by a pyramid), air-octahedron and water-icosahedrons. Physical bodies were identified with ideal geometrical forms in accordance with the ' Platonic thesis of identity of idea and being. Platonic matter was held to be a kind of body lacking all qualities except ideal forms which physical bodies imitate. 'The conception of causality was one of a temporal necessity of underlying idea' forms.9

Another significant feature which needs to be pointed out is that the discipline of geometry developed by Euclid avoided difficulties which rose with the discovery of incommensurability. Notions about existence of mathematical objects or the criteria for legitimization of mathematical objects which Pythagoreans upheld were much more stringent than J that of Euclid. It appears there was a major difference between Pythagorean and Euclidean mathematics. Pythagorean atomism and equivalence of geometry and arithmetic inevitably leads to the problem of .incommensurability which stalls any further development. The criterion about "existence" which Euclid adopted from Eleatic tradition transcends this impasse leaving behind the problem of incommensurability. What remains common between Pythagorean and Euclidean mathematics was the acceptance of mathematical objects as monas (indestructible mental objects)

Now we are in a position to summaries the distinct features of Greek mathematics which envelopes its potentiality and its limitations.


  1. Atomism: Objects of mathematics were elemental, "complete in itself, "monas"; like point line, number, etc.,

  2. Criterion for existence of mathematical truth was twofold. For Pythagoreans it was the principle of constructability (genesis) and for Euclid it was the idealist criteria of indirect proof. As Eucljd reinterpreted Pythagorean mathematics in his own terms and the bulk of Greek mathematics is available through his writings, we can regard the methodology of indirect proof as dominant criteria of Greek mathematics. Thus anti-empiricism was its another dominant feature.

  3. Inclination of Greek mathematics was towards hypothesized ontological realm of stat/'s which was identified with the true realm of being.
(2)


Just where Greek mathematics was weak, Indian and Chinese mathematics were strong, namely in algebra, arithmetic and empirical geometry. Though the mathematical research in India and China was not without differences, still both these civilizations had intrinsic algebraic and empirical inclination. Now we will go into some details of the Chinese and Indian mathematics which indicate their fundamental attitudes.

Unlike Greek civilization which was comparatively short lived, history of Chinese civilization is a story of great continuity. Throughout the history of China refinement of the practical art of calculation played an important role in the process of concept formation in their mathematics. Even till the present day, abacus plays its role in clerical work in China and Japan. Some years back, in a competition between a modern electronic calculator and Soroban (Japanese abacus) the latter proved its efficiency for all the arithmetic operations except multiplication. Such is the efficiency of calculation procedures perfected by Chinese civilization. The principle of place-value10 in numeral notations in its origin is intimately related to calculation procedure of the abacus. Numeral notation of only 9 figures combined with place-value component appears as early as the Shang period in China (1400 SC). This had profound influence throughout the history of China on the process of concept formation and the nature of mathematical enquiry. Chinese never had a separate philological unitary symbol for special fractions (like 2/3, the fraction so important to Mesopotamia). Numbers were constructed out of nine figures only. What followed was early development of decimal system of writing numbers rather than being stuck at in-itself monadic numerical entities and their unfolding into ratios as in Greece. On the other hand Greek preoccupations never allowed appreciation of the principle of place value. The important point we note here is that the Chinese did not view number as an atomic and indivisible entity, and as a consequence the realm of numbers got explored exhaustively.

With their early use of decimal' fraction in expressing roots, Chinese mathematicians never encountered the dilemma of irrational which, perplexed the Greeks. In China extraction of square and cube roots were highly developed by 100 B.C. Chinese rules resemble Aryabhata and Brahmgupta's rules- of extraction given in about 5th-6th century A.D. These very rules influenced a-Kashi (15th century A.D.) in Arabia and Shortly after spread to Europe. Similarly negative numbers were quite acceptable to Chinese and Indian mathematicians. Greeks had no notion of these and their first satisfactory treatment in Europe came only as late as in 1545 A.D. by Jerome Garden. Conception of negative numbers was possible because the notion of arithmetic operation was assigned more potency than the notion of number as an entity.

Solid geometry which developed in China was overtly of an empirical kind whereas plain geometry was essentially algebraic. Problems concerning right-angled triangles were exhaustively solved in a pure algebraic way. In fact, in Needham's view, the invention' of coordinate plane geometry should be attributed to the Chinese civilization."

One noticeable feature of Chinese mathematics was the lack of formulation of the equivalence sign (' = '). All throughout Chinese history algebraic operations were, carried out without the sign of equality. This was one feature which differentiated 1 Chinese algebra and Indian algebra. While without the sign of equality, Chinese solved complex systems of linear algebraic equations, systems of indeterminate linear equations and also higher order, algebraic equations. Chinese in fact developed a peculiar, way of writing equations. The equations were represented by coefficients arranged in a matrix form and the rules of operation developed to solve them. Even Chinese multiplication tables were learned by students in a 9x9 matrix from with 45 elements and the significance of location of number was implicit. We can also find close parallels in the nature of Chinese language and the format or kind of representation that Chinese algebra developed. Chinese mathematics therefore developed at an early date the idea of subtracting columns and rows as in .the simplification [of d determinants. 17th century Japanese scholars transformed this Chinese method into vigorous symbolic form and developed the theory of determinants. Seki Kowa published his theory of determinants in 1683—-a decade prior to Leibnitz's work published in 1693. In fact Needham argues that Leibnitz's philosophy was influenced by Chinese Confucian texts which a Christian jurist brought to him and gives evidence that Leibnitz was familiar with writings translated from Chinese language. For the solution of higher order equations the Chinese developed a format of triangular [representation of J coefficients of different orders. This is the so called Pascal’s triangle of binomial coefficients12 and it was known to the Chinese by 1100 A.D. Another result of. the development of a particular format of representation by the Chinese was their theory of iteration for the solution of algebraic equations.

Chinese called the method of iteration 'too much and the little less this method has also an affinity with the Chinese dialectical thought and the theory of Yin and Yang. Solution to an equation is assumed beforehand and the near exact answer is iterated out. In this method the solution fluctuates between less than actual and more than actual and in this way convergence to actual is realized. Inexactitude of numbers did not put Chinese into uneasy position. This process of solving equations began to be appreciated in Europe only in the 19th century and is more in vogue today after the modern computer has come into being. Methodologically the procedure is inclined towards constructive approach rather than analytic approach. Constructive approach is epistemologically inclined towards empiricism as it is intrinsically related with calculation procedure. In this sense the entire Chinese tradition of algebra and arithmetic was empiricist at its root. This is in line with naturalistic philosophical tradition of China which had little appreciation of ideal entities and their associated ontological realm of statis.

Just as in China, in India also the importance of place value and decimal in numerical notation was realized quite early. In fact the unique feature of early Indian mathematics was the wide "and liberal exploration of the realm of numbers. Word numeral, for _ as big a quantity as 1012 {Parardha) is given in various Samhitas™. On the other hand the biggest word-numeral available in the Greek tradition was 104('Myrioi' — the symbol Mu in Greek numerals). In early India even fractions were regarded as numbers unlike Greeks who did not have such a notion. Sulbasutras denote fractional numbers by the general term 'bhaga'. All mathematical operations were as much valid for fractions as they were for numbers. Unlike Pythagoreans and Euclid, numbers were not regarded as atomic monads existing priori, but as entities whose being is brought forth and dependent on mathematical operations. It is only the outlook which considers mathematical operation as foundational that can bring negative numbers and zero into being. And this did happen in India. Zero and negative numbers were considered at par with other numbers and by the time Brahmagupta (7th century A.D.) explicit rules were formulated for arithmetical operations involving such numbers.

The stress on fundamentally of operations over being of numbers steered Indian mathematics clear of any problem with incommensurability. The Greeks accepted only those entities as numbers that were commensurable with unity, which was for them the principle of being out of which all numbers should arise In India surd numbers known as Karani were accepted as number in very early. Times14 and rules for handling them developed. Though rational - irrational classification did not develop but notion of exact (nitya) and inexact (anitya) numbers was developed.16 Instead of bothering about the nature of being of irrationals, procedures were developed for hhe calculation of these numbers. The Sulbasutras gave the value of √2 correctly to more than five decimal places. Inexactitude of a number for higher calculation was quite acceptable to the Indians.' Awareness of the inexactitude of π which to the Greeks was again a monadic ratio embodying in itself the fundamental truth of the circle, was evident to ancient Indians. Aryabhata gave the value of π= 62832/20000 = 3.1416 and more importantly he was aware of it inexactitude as were other Indian mathematicians. Constant revisions in the value of π occurred from time to time, which eventually lead to the discovery by Indian mathematicians of infinite series converging to the value of Π BY the 15th century. The popularity of Indian methods can be gauged by the fact that Al Kashi in 1427 explained how w can be calculated (correct upto 16 decimal places) by using Indian methods .

In Indian mathematics, Geometry never got idealized in the way it did in Greece. Solid geometry in India as in China was largely empirical. Indian plane geometry was essentially algebraic in character, but in its approach and concept it was quite different from Chinese efforts. What we refer to today as Trigonometry was quite developed in India by the 5th century A.D. Because of their geometric emphasis the Greeks used chords in their astronomical calculations, whereas the Indians developed the notion of sines and versines quite early. Aryabhata was perhaps the first to give a special name to these functions and to draw up a table of sines for each degree. Approximate algebraic expressions were also developed for these functions16. Indian influence flowed to medieval Arab mathematics where Al Battani (858 - 929 A. D.) used the sines regularly with a clear realisation of their superiority over Greek chords and introduced functions akin to the itangent and cotangent functions. Abdul-Wafa (940-998 AD) introduced the recant and cosecant.

In Indian mathematics the realm of numbers was regarded as homogeneous— homogeneous with respect to arithmetical operations. Anuyogadvara Sutra (100 BC) classified numbers into three categories (1) Sankhyata (numerable) (2) Asankhyata (innumerable) arid (3) Ahanta (infinite), and further classifies them into several classes. Implicit within this classification is the idea of homogeneity of numbers as the classification and is based on -the shades of meaning of finite and infinite. Idea that realm of numbers is homogeneous is behind the various rules of operation which are defined in Indian mathematics for positive as well as negative numbers, zero and even for infinity. In contrast the Greek realm of. numbers was colorful and heterogeneous. The Pythagorean classification of numbers into plane numbers, triangular, square numbers, solid numbers etc. was a scheme of classification based on the property of figurative being of numbers.

The idea of realm of numbers as homogeneous is an essential prerequisite for the development of algebra. Idea of provisionally indeterminate number or unknown or unaccomplished quantity can be meaningfully worked out only if its domain of activity is homogeneous. The central imagery behind mature Indian algebra (called Bija Ganita) was that if one sows a seed {bija) in the field of numbers (Ksetra) then one can harvest fruit (phala)—Bija and phafa were technical mathematical terms for the unknown and the solution. Idea of algebraic equations got developed very early in India. Sthananga sutra (300 BC) classified algebraic equations according to the number of unknown in it. Brahmagupta (628 A. D.) classified equations as (1) with one unknown including higher order equations (2) with many unknowns (3) with product of unknowns. Brahmagupta also extended the earlier theory of Aryabhata of Kuttaka, the analysis of indeterminate equations (where the solutionis restricted to integral or rational values only) which was to form a major part of Indian algebra in the later centuries.

Thus the heritage of algebra has been the hallmark of the mathematics of the Chinese and the Indians, and later of the Arabs—though the tradition of algebra was not a homogeneous one as the directionality of the mathematical enquiries of these civilizations was different despite the underlying commonality. In essence the Asian algebraic tradition is fundamentally distinct from the abstract geometric tradition of the Greeks- If in mathematics entities are regarded as having being or nonbeing then the existence criteria would require the method of indirect proof as it evolved in Greek tradition. But if entities are regarded as accomplished and no accomplished then the existence criteria would be constructability. Indeed Indian mathematics may be said to use 'algorithmic logic' in which the central principle is that of constructability.

Here we can see a homology at the foundational level between Indian mathematics, Indian logic and Indian linguistics. The main theoretical concern of Indian linguistics was constructability of accomplished entities of language. Neither did Indian linguistics regard its abstract constructs nor formal universal as real any more than Indian mathematics regarded its formal algebraic universals as real. Algorithmic logic begins from unaccomplished and ends in accomplished entity — so whatever formal apparatus it uses, such formal universal cannot claim being at par with accomplished entities. In fact the methodology of Indian linguistics as brought out even in the most ancient texts such as Rg Pratisakhya explicitly recognizes the importance of Apavada Sutra (exception rules) and Nipatana Sutra (counter-rules) and even goes further to stipulate as a metarule that the exception is stronger than the Samanya Sutra (universal rule) in cases where both are applicable. Thus the fallibility of the universal is accepted in principle as a metalogical truth, this is acknowledging that logical order and real order are not parallel and that the universal is a construct and can never posit itself in the world as infallibly real, arid existing a priori.17 This approach is fundamentally' different from the Platonic theory of ideas which held logic universals to be real and transcendent. It is on Platonic reform of Eleatic philosophy and logic that Euclid built his methodology 'which still gives foundational security to modern formalist and axiomatic logic and mathematics.


(3)


We now come to the transformation which took place in Europe around the 16th and 17th centuries. Underneath this transformation was an assimilation of knowledge within European folds from other cultures as well as birth of new intentionality in the development of knowledge. This intentionally makes European efforts different from the Arab, efforts, though from the 10th century onwards Arabs also assimilated knowledge of. different cultures in a big way and gave algebra a refined status of a separate discipline. While the new science of Europe assimilated knowledge of other medieval sciences its birth is marked by a certain polemical attitude towards these sciences. In place of acknowledging its debt to immediate parental tradition of knowledge, Europe saw itself arising out of natural foundations of distant Greek science. In the process it interpreted Greek mathematics in a way suited to its intentionality. All this had profound impact on concept formation in European mathematics. From 12th century onwards algebraic books of Arabic origin and later Greek books were translated into Latin and other European languages. But only in the 16th century the mathematical research of Europe ascends to different levels with a new awakening. Within a century, Viete (1540-1603), Stevin (1548-1620),[ Descartes (1596 - 1650) and Wallis (1616-1703), gave new foundation to mathematics largely depending on the Greek heritage for its method and on the Asian heritage for its content.

In the preface to Isagoge (subtitled : Introduction to Analytical Art) Viete the father of 'modern algebra' says, "Behold, the art which I present is new, but in truth so old, I so spoiled and defiled by the brabarians, that I considered it necessary, in order to introduce an entirely new form into it, to think out and publish a new vocabulary, having gotten rid of all its pseudo-technical terms (pseudo-categoreniatis) lest it should retain its filth and continue to stink in the old way. And yet underneath the Algebra or Afmucaba/a (of Arabian origin) which they lauded and called the great art, all mathematicians recognized that incomparable gold lay hidden, though they used to find little.18 The very expression 'algebra' belonged for Viete to barbarian pseudo-terminology. He sets forth developing a general analytic art where every number can be expressed by its 'species' (eidos) and the question 'how many?' can be left indeterminate provisionally for analytical purpose. Viete arrives at the conception of a mode of calculation which is carried out completely in terms of the species of numbers and calls it "logistice speciosa". 'Logistice speciosa' he applied to pure algebra, which he understood as most comprehensive possible analytic art, indifferently applicable to numbers and to geometric magnitudes. This new conception of eidos, because of algebraic concern, was ontologically independent (contrary to Greek use of eidos) and was mere symbolic formalism. Therefore the most important tool of mathematical natural science, the 'formala', first became possible. Here we see the metamorphosis of Greek ontological eidos to rationalistic dimensions. From now on ontological science of the Greeks is replaced by a symbolic discipline whose ontological presuppositions are left unclear. , What remain in mathematics are a method, Greek logic and Greek proof. The actualization of this method is sought in the realm of algebra which naturally transcends application part of mathematics, namely arithmetic and geometry in Viete's view. Pure analytic art of algebra is visualized as renewal of the Greek spirit. This idea of renewal played constitutional role for resurrection of the lost spirit in the form of analytic mathematical knowledge.19

Stevin, a contemporary of Viete and Kepler, is also possessed by the idea of a renewal and he casts it into the special image of a unknown 'wise Age' which must be brought back. Barbaric age for him extends from the beginning of the Greeks to the present. Stevin does not consider Greeks to be the only luminaries of the 'wise Age'. Vision of 'wise Age' is constructed out of elements of heritage of India, China, Arabs as well as Greeks. The Arabic digital and positional system in his view is immensely superior to Greek notations and is a heritage of 'wise age'. Algebra, which Europe became acquainted through Arbaic books and whose trace is not to be found in the Chaldaeans, the Hebrews, the Romans and the Greeks again hints at the 'wise Age'. Astronomy of Ptolemy, which has traces of perfect knowledge, is exemplary of near extinction of perfect understanding of the course of heaven whose other elements can be traced to the writings of the Arabic tongue. The heliocentric theory in particular is said to have had an origin of great antiquity. Alchemy again is a science of 'wise age' which he says was unknown to Greeks. Stevin is an interesting thinker in many ways, he wrote and taught mathematics, only in Flemish and held the title of professor of Dutch mathematics what differentiates Stevin from his contemporary thinkers of Europe is the peculiar bent of his cultural sensitivity which is evident from his bias in characterizing wise age'. On the other hand what unites him with his contemporaries is his view that right order must be used in writing and teaching of mathematics. Right order taught by the ‘wise age', is the mode of presentation of the Euclid’s Element, which he calls ‘order natural’. His projection of algebra as well as method of Euclid's Element into 'wise age' unfolded peculiar directions in his mathematics research.

Stevin totally rejected Greek concept of Arithmos as well as its modification in Viete. 'Unit’ to him is a number as much as other numbers rather than a primordial entity or even the beginning of numbers. For him, there are no absurd, irrational, irregular, inexplicable or surd numbers and these terms arise as a result of the schism between actualt mode of understanding of number and the traditional Greek concept of number for him even roots and powers are just plain numbers. This homogenization of numbers into one category was a typically Arabian, Indian and Chinese [notion of number as opposed to Greek Arithmos, a figurative conception of number. Only radical acceptance of Arabian tradition could open up possibility of such view of numbers which escaped grip of Viete who kept Greek notion of species of numbers. He argues that}number is not at all a discontinuous quantity as against the bias arising out of Greek indivisibility of the 'unit'. 'One' can be continuously divided into fractions. Continuous magnitude corresponds to continuous number much like water, which can be added and subtracted continuously. This identification of the realm of] numbers with continuum also led him to see new correspondence between geometry and algebra which was destined to culminate in Descartes Coordinate Geometry and a concept of real line. It is this correspondence (between Asian and Greek1 mathematics) which till today embodies a tension20. This new correspondence was based on a denial of specific nature of Greek corres-pondence at the same time assertion of its spirit in method.

A central feature in the emerging new directions was the notion of natural law. The notion of natural law was a distinct feature of European intentionality and can perhaps be traced back to the culture of Judeo-Christian tradition. The notion of natural law occurs .for instance in Thomas Aquinas (11th century) who thought God was just a prime mover (first cause, etc.,) of the universe, and the universe moves along preordained path and man's duty is to discover the preordained order, which is only accessible through reason, so that he can make this universe his just home. Greek notion of statis is reincarnated to represent static rational order .which has been left by God to be discovered by man. Here, we see there was ample amount of space for Platonism to make a comeback. And it did. Number of historians of science has analyzed resurrection or Platonism in 16th, 17th century Europe21. Stress on the study of space and harmony gradually gave way to deontological Platonism. a rationalist doctrine of methodological monism (Strees on uniqueness of method).

In the 16th century, Fransicus Patritius (1 93) argued that study of space must come before study of matter. Copernicus used mathematical harmony as an argument for his cosmology and wrote 'nothing unfitting [Geometrically] occurs in the course of their [planets] orbit". Kepler spoke of a system of five regular solids, which could be inserted between the sphere of six planets, as the cause of the planets being six in number. Galileo wrote that the ' book of nature is written in geometrical tradition". The phenomenal world imitated the rational order of primary qualities (qualities whose mathematical quantification is possible) and secondary qualities (experimental sensuous world) arise because of the effect of primary qualities on senses. The realm of knowledge now is the realm of primary qualities.

This understanding was in fact; neo-Platonic because primary qualities were not just geometrical magnitudes but also magnitudes of mass and time. Mass and time unlike spatial magnitude are algebraic quantities as they are not infinitely divisible but additive. The difference between infinite divisibility and additivity in my view is the fundamental distinction between space and time." It was this difference which was ignored in Western mathematics and time was geometrized on the plea that space as well as time is continuous quantities. But continuity itself has two meanings, one as continuous divisibility of space, and the other as continuous addivity of time. The fundamental difference between space and time which has affinity towards difference between geometric and algebraic views, was ignored in the analytical unification of these two trends by the West.

The analytic equivalence of algebra and geometry made possible handling of these disciplines at the same plane. However, the earlier tension between geometric and algebraic view has been transformed into, a tension between ideal and empirical mathematics in so far as intentionally of Europe saw geometric Greek tradition as a method and Asian algebraic tradition as an object of mathematics. This transformation was also forced in because the science of physiology of William Harvey, magnetism of Gilbert, and developments in Chemistry showed that logic of experiential science was not absolutely bound to mathematical expression, that there is a realm where mathematical necessity is not demonstrable. This brought about a tendency towards the deontologisation of mathematics and Science. The empirical and experiential streams of science was integrated in mathematical science by transforming the experiential into experimental which is governed by teleology of mathematics. In this process the ontologising aspect of 'Greek method was forgotten and the emphasis was put on method itself and later on epistemology. Mathematics as well was science developed along deontologised rationalism. The aim of mathematics became relation of abstract to abstract and eventually was reduced to the status of language for understanding of reality. A tendency towards formalism, logicism and axiomatic gained ground in Europe and by the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century this tendency reached its climax. Analytic art and new symbolism of Viete and Stevin became an end in itself. Mathematics became purely analytical and self-referential discipline. This deontologising of mathematics brought about separation of mathematical realm and physical | realm. It was thought that logic does not commit us to any apriori-assumption about physical reality. It constituted a realm which needs no empirical referent but stands alongside the experiential world and is potentially realizable as the true ground of experiential world.

But in deontologised mathematics what ensures the security of mathematical knowledge? Hilbert (1862-1943) thought that if only completeness and consistency2,2 _of.an axiomatic system can be proved then independent criteria for legitimization of mathematical knowledge with ontology-freeness is achieved. The discipline of Meta-Mathematics was born to demonstrate consistency and completeness of axiomatised Mathematics In ,1931, Kurt Godel disproved what Hilbert wanted to prove, by his [famous undesirability theorem.23 The immediate consequence of Godel's theorem" was that there exists no set of mathematical truths which if assumed, given, all the rest will be derived from them. In other words no formalized system will exhaust mathematical theory. Mathematics as a discipline is logically an open system. This- brought about severe strains on the rationalistic program for mathematics. Mathematics was not a discipline folding onto itself with self-referential completeness that forms a world of its own -either of a symbolic kind [or of a Platonic J realm of ideas. It has the same features as the rest of reality namely, that of open-endedness, of cross-referential growth and of
temporality.

The 19th and 20th century also saw the rise of Intuitionist school of mathematics as a trend critical of rationalist mathematics. Another reason for the rise of intuitionism was the discovery of unavoidable paradoxes, in the set theory .of Cantor (1845-1918). The intuitionists do not accept laws of logic as either a priori or eternal. Logic is subject to change. Logic which is valid for finite objects might not be valid for infinite objects like sets containing infinite elements. They do not accept actual infinity as an object of mathematics but only accept potential infinity as was maintained by Hegel, Locke and almost all empiricists. The law of excluded middle was unacceptable to them. This was a fundamental critique of .Rationalist mathematics, as rationalism had accepted Greek logic as the only kind of mathematical logic. For intuitionists, logic was not formal calculus but a methodology, logic of knowledge dealing with transformation of our inferences. Since mathematics is not derived from either logic-or, experience it must originate in a special intuition that presents us the basic concepts and inferences of mathematics as immediately clear and secure. Such basic notion is the notion of natural numbers. As L. Kronecker had said "God gave us the integers, all else are man's handiwork." The criteria now of legitimization of existence of mathematical truth are the principle of constructability. The sole admissible technique of demonstration of existence theorem is effective construction because it permits us to see what it is all about. On the other hand, the method of indirect proof does nothing but points to possibility of existence or of truth, without warranting it. Explicit and effective construction is possible only with finalistic procedures, that is, by means of finite number of signs and operations, as is the case for instance in the computation of the square of a number24. Hence, all propositions involving infinite classes regarded as totalities must be excluded from mathematics. Also theorems that are demonstrated in an indirect way must be eliminated or reconstructed (like most theorems of Cantor's theory of sets) 25. In the rationalist tradition, whose roots go back to Greeks, it was possible to prove the pure existence of objects that cannot be constructed (like most of the modern theorems, using method of indirect proof). On the other hand, intuitionists argued that by according such "ideal" objects the same validity-as real, or finitely cons-tractable objects, mathematics is being robbed away of its potency. Besides, Godel had shown that Hilbert’s rationalist scheme was doomed to failure.

But even after intuitionists, critique and Godel's proof, formalism flourishes in the West. Cantor's set theory and in general, pure-existence proofs are accepted in western mathematical culture, which today is not limited by geographical boundaries of the West but is practiced in India, China as well as in Greece. . Still we can say that this century is characterized by the resurgence of empirical mathematics in the West though it is a rebel tendency and, in miniscule minority. At least the tension which has all along been present in modern Western mathematics (between ideal mathematics and empirical mathematics) has to some extent come to surface today. It is my contention that this tension has its roots in the tension between Asian algebraic tradition and Greek geometric tradition. For the purposes of this study, we may still employ the categories well known in modern philosophical discourse, and summaries these two ideological positions, as they are represented in Modern Western mathematics in the following:

Earlier manifestation
of ideological tension
Ontological inclination
Algebraic approach
(Indian,Chinese)
Geometric approach
(Greek)
Epistemology Phenomenal Dynamis stress on
becoming
Statis stress on being
inclination Existence
criteria
Reasonableness (Empiricism) Rationalism (Idealism)
Mathematical objects Temporality
Constructibility
Finitistic, blur, fuzy.
Spatiality Indirect proof
Dominant Character of
continuity
Continuous additivity In-itself monads, need not be finitistic. Continuous divisibility

While there has been a serious and ongoing debate on the foundations of mathematics in the West in recent times, it has had little or no impact on mathematical practice or on the development of mathematics, which have been totally conditioned by the formalist methodology derived from the Greek tradition. At the same time, very .little has been achieved by way of comprehending the non-Western mathematical' traditions as only very few of the original source-works have been brought to light or studied (that too mainly in the context of analyzing the European, assimilation 'of the non-European tradition) and even in these limited studies there has been no recognition of the fact that the non-European traditions had their own foundational conceptions and methodologies. This lack of comprehension of what may be called the cultural and philosophical roots of mathematics in different traditions, has totally crippled, our understanding of mathematics and its potentialities and calls for urgent and much more extensive investigations into the foundational conceptions and methodologies of mathematics in different traditions."


Bibliography:


  1. Africa, Thomas W ; Science and f State in Greece and Rome.

  2. Bag, A. K: Mathematics in Ancient and Medivial India-Chaukhambha Orientalia, Varanasi, 1979.

  3. Bishop, Erret: Foundations of Constructivist Analysis, 1967.

  4. Bunge, Mario : Intuition and Science,

  5. Burtt, Edwin Arther: Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science.

  6. Dutta B. and Singh A. N. : History of Hindu Mathematics 2 Vols. Motilal Banarsidas, 1935.

  7. Jammer, Max : Concept of space : The history of theory of space in Physics. Harvard Univ., Press, 1969.

  8. Klein, Jacob : Greek Mathematics and the origin of Algebra. M. I. T. Press, 1968.

  9. Koyre, Alexander : Metaphysics and measurement: Essays in scientific revolution. Chapman and Hall. London, 1968.

  10. Lokatos, Imre : Mathematics, Sceince and Epistemology.

  11. Mikami, Y The Development of Mathematics in China and Japan. Feubner, Leipzig, 1913.

  12. Navjyoti Singh: Foundations of Logic in Ancient India: Linguistics and Mathematics, in, A. Rahaman. (Ed.), Science and Technology in Indian culture, New Delhi, 1984.

  13. Needham, J. and Wang Ling: Science and Civilisation in China. Vol. 2 & 3, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959.

  14. Neugebauer, O: The Exact Sciences of Antiquity. Princeton Univ. Press, N. J., 1952.

  15. Szabo, Arpad : Beginning of Greek Mathematics, Reidel, 1978.

  16. Whewell, William: Philosophy of Discovery: Chapters historical and critical.


Author: Navjyoti Singh,

Note:
1. " Most of the historians of mathematics agree about this point. Greeks solved difficult algebraic problems in purely geometric way, ex: xS + ab=b2. On the other hand, problems concerning right angled triangle were exhaustively solved by Indians and Chinese in purely algebraic way.

2. Method of indirect proof is also known as method of reduction ad absurdum. Following are the assumptions behind this method :
a) A statement has a singular negation, important corollary of this principle is principle of double negation.
b) If by assuming 'not A' to be true logical inconsistency can be logically demonstrated, then "A-is demonstrated to be true. This method is widely used in modern mathematics.

3. Link between mathematics and philosophy can be ascertained from certain ' crucial Greek categories, namely, marijam-learning matter, ma thesis- study discipline, matbexis- participation and characterization of mathematical truth as mathematic (as thing to be learned).

4. This is the view of most of the historians of Greek mathematics. About Greek geometry 0. NEUGE-BAUER AND ARPAD SZABO and about algebra JACOB-KLEIN have substantiated this view.

5. This doctrine of Pythagoras remained fundamental to the whole of Greek mathematics but was opposed by musicians. For instance, Aristoxenus wrote, "We are attempting to draw conclusions which are in agreement with the experience as opposed the theorists who preceded us. Some of them introduced completely foreign view-point into the subject and dismissed sensory experience as imprecise ; hence they made up intelligible causes and stated that there were certain ratios between numbers and speeds on which the pitch of a note depended. These were all speculations which are completely foreign to the subject and absolutely contrary to appearances", {quoted by SZABO—p. 113). The theorists were the Pythagoreans and their empiricist critique by Aristoxenus had little Impact on Greek mathematics. This tension remained till the time of Plato who sided with Pythagoreans, in denouncing musicians as immature in the debate over the smallest musical interval 'coma'. This debate has been dealt by WILLIAM WHEWELL, Today we know with certainty that some of these musical notes are actually unratioable incommensurable magnitudes and hence the empiricist critique was sound.

6. We may give an example of Eleatic usa of this method to refute Aneximenes. Eleatic assertion was: 'what is, cannot have 'come to being' Proof: Suppose that what is did come to being (assuming negation to! be true,) _then it could only .have come from what is, or from what is not (only mutually exclusive singular negation admitted). There is no third possibility (principle of excluded middle). Now if it had come from what is. rt would already have been existent before it came into being hence to say that it came into being in this way would make no sense. If (on the other hand,' the claim is made that what «came from what is not. this leads immediately to a contradiction {adynat'on) (principle Of consistency). What is can never have been the opposite of itself, what is not, and hence, could not have come into being this way either, ' Hence the assertion is proved (again the principle of excluded middle is used).

7. Vet another contribution of Eleatic philosophy to future Greek Mathematics was the notion of hypothesis. According to Eleatic view, no empirical test can be devised to check whether or not "an assertion" is correct since all physical experience, must in principle be rejected as false-or unreliable. Hence, assertions have to be taken up and .tested in reason. The assertions now have a status of hypothesis. The consequence of' any hypothesis could be examined by their method to see if they lead to contradiction. And if contradiction does not follow the hypothesis stands tested. Likewise, most of the notions in axiomotised mathematics have their root in idealist philosophy of Parmenides and his followers.

8. Jacob Klein, p. 313.

9. This understanding of causality later played important constitutive role for evolution of Kepler's laws of celestial mechanics.
10. The principle of place value is the realization that if divisor is 10 or a power of 10, it is unnecessary to divide as it can be taken care of by shifting the position of numerals with respect to each other. Modern way of writing number uses this scheme whereas the latin numerals do not,

11. Chinese equations ended with implicitly understood ' =: -f- n', n being a constant term. In the early medieval period, it ended having ' = 0', the constant term joining rest of the terms as '-n'.

12. Pascal's triangle is constituted out of coefficients of expansion of (X + Y)n for positive integer n. Arabs as well as Indians also knew of pascal's triangle quite early. In 1252 Nasir al-Din al-Tusi wrote in detail about as pension of (X + Y)n. He explained the method as a current practice, not as a new invention.

13. Datta (1935) p. 9. Later Buddhist text Lalitavistara {100 BC) mentions 'tallaksana' = 1058 and quotes from earlier Jain literature a word numeral 'Sirsaprahe//ka' = order of 102c0.

14. It is important to note that the term- Karani is used for surd root and quantity of root could be rational or irrational. For instance Apastamba Sulbasutra uses chatuskarani = 4 for the number 2.

15. Apastamba Sulbasutra makes this distinction while dealing with squaring of a circle. In later literature terms like 'sthulamana or sthulaganana were used for approximate value or approximate calculation.

16. Sines and" other trigonometrically numbers are not usual numbers. They are expressible only as summation of infinite series (which were to be later discovered by the Indian mathematicians, who kept on calculating approximate values of these functions and improving on them.

17. For a more-detailed discussion of the foundational methodology of Indian linguistics and its similarity with the methodology of Indian mathematics, see Navjyoti Singh (1964)
18. Translation from Latin to English of Viete's Isagoge is included in the appendix of JACOB KLEIN'S book.

19. Incidentally Viete did not choose sides between Ptolemy and Copernicus as he saw between them no fatal tension. On the one hand, he remained committed to Ptolemy's astronomy and on the other he accepted the Copernicus's thesis because it retains the method of Ptolemy's science.

20. See for instance. JOHN MYHILL, "What is real number?" Amer. Math. Monthly, Vol. 79, # 7 P. 748-754, Aug. Sept., 1972. Does every point on real line correspond to a number? If principle of constructivism is used then real I line is full of holes. Most of the real line is non-algebraic numbers called transendental number and there is no method for constructing them.

21. A. Koyre and E. A. Burtt have explicity taken this position.

22. Criterion of consistency: There exists no statement in the axiomatic scheme which can be proved as well as disproved from within. Criterion of completeness : There exists no statement constituted out of objects of the axiomatic scheme which can neither be proved nor disproved from within the system. That is there exists no undividable proposition in the axiomatic scheme.

23. For a 'simple' statement of Godel's Theorem, let us quote the following from 'The Encyclopedia of Philosophy" Ed. Paul Edwards, Mcgraw Hill 1967:
By Godel's theorem the following statement is generally meant : In any formal system adequate for number theory there exists an undividable formula — that is a. formula that is not provable and where negation is not provable. A corollary to the theorem is that the consistency of d formal system adequate for number theory cannot be proved within the system'.

24. Recently another constructionist trend came up with the publication in 1967 of a book by Erret Bishop. Bishop was not much interested in founding mathematics as the intuitionists were but with doing mathematics constructively. Bishop tried to reformulate Cantor's theory by avoiding "idealistic" notions and continually checking the objects and theorems generated for intuitive meaning.

25. One classic instance of pure existence proof is Cantor's proof of infinite number of transcendental (non-algebraic) numbers, which does not give the slightest hint of how even a single transcendental number might be found. It proves existence of such numbers by proving that it would be contradictory for them not to exist. Pure existence proofs now pervade modern mathematics, like, it can be proved that a differential equation has a unique solution without showing a way to reach that solution. Intuitionists and constructivists are critical of such kind of mathematics. 69


REVIEW ESSAY - PHENOMENOLOGY AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Indian thinkers have long felt the schism between Indian and Western philosophies and an equally strong desire to transcend this schism. They have recognized a strong need to, at least, open a serious discourse between the two traditions disburse that has not really taken place on an equal footing. Thus it seemed important when two major institutions of philosophy came together to organize this international conference. The ICPR, the chief patron of philosophical research in India, and the CARP, which is dedicated to the cause of the advancement of phenomenology, jointly conceived the theme of the conference, on which a meaningful discourse across the two traditions was thought to be possible.

The conference had chiefly to do with the work of Prof. J.N. Mohanty, an Indian philosopher currently based in the U.S.A., who is acclaimed to be a leading phenomenologist in the West. Prof. Mohanty has written several papers and a book on issues dealing with Indian philosophy. It is his labor that had actually prepared the intellectual ground for discourse and made possible the mobilization of Western scholars associated with CARP and Indian scholars associated with ICPR.

One naturally expected some major comments to be voiced in this conference on the comparative state of the Indian and Graeco-European philosophical traditions. More so, since Prof. Mohanty's stature in contemporary Western philosophy is well established and because he has done serious research on Indian philosophy as well. But, strangely enough, the event fell short of this expectation. Several papers only dealt with one tradition and had no comparative content while others had poor comparative content, the noteworthy exceptions being the papers of Prof. Mohanty and Prof. Kern. It seems to me, however, the failure was a consequence of the -perspective within which the conference was conceived. This is not to suggest, though, that the proceedings of the conference did not lead to the precipitation of several deep comparative questions. Indeed, the conference provided an occasion to reflect fruitfully on the current state of comparative scholarship.

To begin with the idea for the conference was conceived within the unequal context characteristic of the current state of the politics of knowledge. A particular system of philosophy namely, transcendental phenomenology was singled out from the Western tradition. Edmund Husserl had described transcendental phenomenology as (a) the first ever scientific philosophy devoid of metaphysical pre-suppositions that had plagued all earlier philosophical enterprises of the West; (b) the culmination of a search began by the Greeks which had since fumbled in the wilderness, a search for a secure pivotal platform from which to reflect pre-suppositionlessly and endlessly. Transcendental phenomenology discovered such a platform and thus inaugurated 'scientific philosophizing which is securely founded on that platform.

No particular philosophical system was singled out for comparative probing from the Indian philosophical tradition. As a result, no sustained investigation and presentation of an Indian philosophical system was possible for the comparative purpose. Rather, any fragmentary aspect of Indian tradition could be invoked and pet formulations of 'every aspect' of Indian tradition could be brought in to the comparative discourse. Phenomenology with its sophisticated technical apparatus was, thus, pitched for an encounter with a diluted ideality called 'Indian philosophy which lacked a coherent unified technical apparatus.

It is quite understandable if an encounter is conceived at a civilization level where presuppositions of two philosophical traditions are comparatively debated. Such a discourse can be meaningful even at the expense of abstaining from the technicalities of the various philosophical systems that constitute these traditions. It is equally possible to imagine a comparative endeavor between two philosophical systems belonging to the two traditions so that technical subtleties are able to confront each other. Neither of these two strategies was present here, however. As a result, phenomenology with its formidable terminology was hegemonically present without any Indian philosophical system being able to establish a comparative dialogue with it or vice versa. Another consequence of this inequality was that phenomenology's rootedness in Western tradition remained invisible. Phenomenology was present with its roots mystified and 'Indian philosophy was present with its sophistication obscured.

One wonders if this inequality was the result of a poor state of Indian scholarship or had a deeper rationale grounded in the justified comparative standing of phenomenology vis-a-vis Indian philosophies. Prof. Mohanty's key note address - "Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality" - naturalized and rationalized this inequality and set the limits and tone of discourse. For Mohanty, Husserl's phenomenology gave him 'the stance of a transcendental ego' enabling 'apperception of another world (in this case Indian Philosophy)' and 'understanding other's point of view as a noematic (sense) structure' without sacrificing otherness and thus 'finally realizing the "world-noemata" are of one and the same world, that the identity of world is one identity in and through these differences' [p. 1*4] (2). Mohanty, apparently, is 'convinced that phenomenology provides a unique ground to overcome the relativism of traditions without hurting any tradition [p. 4]. But the reduction of others to noematic structures is an essentially unequal move that absorbs differences in the interests of phenomenology. If others are interpretable as 'sense structures' in Husserlian phenomenology, it, perhaps, eliminates pre-emotively, the possible critique of phenomenology by others. With respect to the Indian tradition, Mohanty declared that '40 years of preoccupation with Husserlian stance has helped me to understand and interpret the Indian philosophical tradition, in this case, not the other but I myself [p. 1-3]. The irony is that the unique stance which transcendental phenomenology gifts him is the very stance he discovers as being absent in the entire Indian philosophical tradition.

Mohanty singled out two reasons for his totalist insight into Indian philosophy.

(A.) The non-availability of a theory of sense (as distinguished from reference), and
(B.) An ontologically oriented mode of thinking [p.10].

Mohanty characterizes various Indian theories of consciousness thus: they oscillate between descriptive psychology and metaphysics of consciousness’ [p.10]. None of these measures up to transcendental constitutive phenomenology 'save, possibly, certain strands in Buddhist theories' [p.10]. Husserl spent his life trying, precisely, to overcome psychologism and metaphysics within the Western tradition. Thus by inference, .Husserl's critique of Western philosophy becomes a critique of the Indian philosophical tradition as well - a case of straightforward transposition. The ball is left in the Indian court. We shall return to other implications of this approach later. The point being made here is that the inequality in the idea of this conference emerged, as noted earlier, as a natural consequence of Mohant’s comments on the alleged uniqueness of phenomenology.

Naturally, the faith in phenomenology remained largely unquestioned in the conference. No serious critique of phenomenology could be found in the papers presented and in the subsequent discussions. The papers followed, more or less, certain thematic patterns. Bruzina, Balaslev, Balasubramaniam and Kern tread the comparative ground rather cautiously. More often than not, their excursions into comparative criticism brought forth criticism internal to the basic premises of phenomenology.* Kern's paper did rupture the boundaries of the phenomenological tradition but he did not situate his critique of phenomenology within the "specificities of an Indian tradition. Then there were papers that discussed Husserl's work within the thematic of a larger Graeco-European philosophical tradition. Parmenides' ancient formulae and speculations on the unity of being and thinking resurfaced in several interesting forms. Mar Greogrios argued ingeniously, citing Heidegger and Dignaga in this regard. Phenomenological hermenutics received some attention, called forth chiefly by Mohant’s own remarks on sabda pramana. In several) instances, it was obvious that Mohantys evaluation of the privileged status of phenomenology, had served as an inducement for discourse.

Ronald Bruzina's "Last Philosophy: Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenological Metaphysics - Eugene Fink with Edmund Husserl: 1928 -1938" described an unfulfilled project of Husserl in collaboration with Fink on certain perennial metaphysical problems of the West. A bit scandalous, this paper showed how metaphysics was to make a comeback in phenomenology despite .its early radical anti-metaphysics attitude. This paper does bring in a mild critique of pure Husserlian phenomenology and its alleged anti-metaphysics pretensions. It was Heidegger's critique of Husserl's implicit metaphysics in phenomenology which had brought back several problems for pure phenomenology as could be seen in Bruzina's paper and also in Thomas K Seebohm's "Paradox of Subjectivity and the Idea of Ultimate Grounding in Husserl and Heidegger". Leaving aside these internal critical problems, phenomenology stood towering above all, with the confidence that other systems of philosophy are interpretable in its terms. This reading of phenomenology was not merely with regard to Indian philosophical systems .but even with Western Analytic philosophy as was evident in discussions by Mohanty and Secbohm and in the arguments attempted by Heelan. The Universalist stance of pure phenomenology never came up for serious examination, and its presuppositions could not be delineated so that they could be shown to withstand criticism.

Karl Schumann's "Husserl and Indian Philosophy" revealed a shocking Eurocentrism on the part of the founder of phenomenology. Husserl thought that the non-European cultures never really 'produced' philosophy [p30]. India for him represented 'only an empirical anthropological type' (Husserliana VI, 14) p. 20]. He thought it is 'to mistake the meaning of the term, and to tamper with it if one speaks of Indian and Chinese philosophy and science’ [(Husserliana VI331), p.24 J. The idea of philosophy as 'self-transparent omniscience in hand', to Husserl was Greek and not merely European. 'Europe aimed at the realization of the absolute idea, no matter how imperfect and distorted their actual results may be, whereas other cultures, notwithstanding even their most brilliant results, never claimed to be intrinsically worried by the explicit idea of philosophical omniscience' [ (Husserliana VI, 325), p.24 ]. 'As animal reason is to human reason, pre-philosophical reason (i.e., Indian thought) is to philosophical reason (European thought)' [(Husserliana, VI, 338) p. 38, fn. 88 ](3). 'Europe or the idea of philosophy is unique in the history of mankind', states HusserL and adds that 'all other groups of mankind are aware of this, not withstanding their unbroken will to spiritual self- reservation, to Europeanise themselves, whereas we, as long as we understand ourselves properly, would never Indianise ourselves’. [(Husserliana, VI, 320) p. 25, fn. 89]. The spectacle of the Europeanisation of all other cultures bear witness to the fact that the European idea of philosophy is of absolute significance for mankind as such' [(Husserliana, VI, 14), fn. 89]. It was as if the colonial success was taken as the success of the European idea of philosophy. The very enterprise of 'philosophy' as construed by Husserl seemed to exclude the Indian philosophical world. Like Hegel, Husserl had no doubts that Europe has a stance which 'comprehends and cancels other cultures' [in. 90].

The question remains - Is this exclusion intrinsic to the very enterprise of phenomenology or is the Eurocentrism in the birth of phenomenology merely incidental/accidental, arising from the contingent fact of colonisation? Schumann and Mohanty are inclined to take the latter view. (Schumann himself could not come to attend the conference and his paper was read by Mohanty, who disclosed that his key note paper was basically complementary to Schumann's paper). Both Schumann and Mohanty feel that the Universalist stance of pure phenomenology could be salvaged out of Husserfs colonial disposition. However, salvageability is not the issue here. The non-hegemonic equality in a comparative dialogue will not get established unless the universalist stance of phenomenology is seriously deconstructed within the western tradition as well as in accordance with Indian philosophies. Otherwise the comparative discourse would merely imply an effort at working out a case that Indian traditions were also 'philosophical’ in the Husserlian sense, either as 'prescientific philosophy’ or even as 'scientific philosophy’.

There is therefore, a need to deconstruct phenomenology’s hegemonic position, to pronounce its own prejudices and rootedness in the western tradition so that comparative discourse could begin. The Universalist pretense of phenomenology requires justification before comparative discourse could be reduced to a mere interpretative discourse on Indian philosophy from the standpoint of pure phenomenology. Even the possibility that there could be a critique of phenomenology from the standpoint of some strands in Indian philosophy was ruled out from this perspective. There could only be the critique of Indian philosophies from the standpoint of phenomenology. The universalistic perspective not only concealed the origin and roots of phenomenology but also its possible critique. It is not surprising, then, that the papers with comparative content did not really break the limits of discourse that inhered in Mohant’s comments and ideas.

Mohanty was inclined to characterize Indian theories of consciousness as 'prescientific' since in them are found positions oscillating between descriptive psychology and metaphysics of consciousness. Anindita Niyogi Balslev in "Analysis of I - Consciousness in the Transcendental Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy" argued that the treatment of consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, as explicated by Madhusudan Saraswati, cannot be classed as either descriptive psychology or metaphysics of consciousness [p. 13]. Thus Advaita Vedanta acquires the status of Husserl's scientific philosophy’. She further suggests an interpretation of the Advaitin concept of adhyasa-s as a constitutive principle of Advaitin 'phenomenological egology’, an interpretation which is radically at variance with Mohanty’s thesis of the absence of the theory of constitution as a significant mark of all 'prescientific philosophies', according to Husserl. The notion of layered adhyasa, starting from ahamkaradhyasa to other adhyasa-s is considered similar to I -consciousness in terms of its three phenomenological reductions. But there is a serious difficulty in interpreting adhyasa as a constitutive principle in the Husserlian sense. For, the function of adhyasa (avidya) has a dual character - of avarana sakti (concealment) and of viksepa sakti (posting out) (karya). It is avarana sakti, the power of concealment that cannot be understood by interpreting adhyasa as a constitutive principle. Adhyasa in its aspect as a concealing principle would violate self-sufficiency and self transparency implied in the theory of constitution. The Advaitin grounding of chaitanya (ahamkara visista) in chit (Brahma) gives adhyasa an altogether different role than the constitutive role of the supposedly ungrounded consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology; so much so that even a descriptive similarity of adhyasa and the theory of constitution for I-consciousness will be problematic. At variance with the character and function of adhyasa, the theory of constitution is construed primarily to avoid grounding which would necessarily bring in metaphysics in the Western context. The deep dissonance of adhyasa and the phenomenological constitutive principle is further indicated by the fact that the Husserlian concepts of transcendental elements of consciousness (like noemata and apodictive give nness in general), arrived at by the strategy of bracketing, eiditic and transcendental reductions, are not obtained by Advaita Vedanta. Moreover, for Advaitins, where is the neutral hyletic data (static constitutive form) which constitutes Object as intentional objects? There seems to be a problem, here in suggesting an interpretation of adhyasa as a constitutive principle.

In comparative discourse it is invariably the difference which is more significant than the similarity since it is the defence of difference which is more pervasive and hence tough and insightful, whereas the thesis on similarity does not require a defence and can afford to overlook systemic entailments which go against the thesis. Like Anandita's paper several papers dealt with phenomenology and Advaita Vedanta without articulating difference or bringing out comparatively the limitations of either to face each other. R. Balasubramanian in "Advaita Vedanta on the Problem of Enworlded Subjectivity" declared that 'Advaita Vedanta may be characterised as "transcendental phenomenology" and "metaphysics of experience" [p.l]' in the same breath. N.K. Devaraja in "Self and Freedom: The Vedantin and Phenomenological Perspectives" was quite contented that the motif of freedom dominates phenomenologists and all systems of Indian thought [p.l]. Ramakanta Sinari in "Comments on J.N. Mohanty’s 'Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality" did not mind a bad joke -'perhaps Husserl was an avtara of Sankara' [p.7]. The two papers of Kalyan Bagchi and Mrinal Kanti Bhadra dealt with phenomenology s interaction with Vedanta as embodied in the thoughts of K.C. Bhattacharya and Kalidas Bhattacharya respectively.

While these papers showed a fairly large scale interest in the comparative study of Advaita Vedanta and phenomenology, most of them used terms like transcendence, transcendent and transcendental vaguely to the extent of losing the comparative ground altogether. Non-precise and synonymous use of these Western philosophical terms did sustain a feeble sense of the similarity of phenomenology and Advaita but they also made the arguments sterile and without force. This was quickly realized and pointed out by the Western phenomenologist’s.

Interestingly enough, Balasubramanian's paper posed some serious questions for Husserl’s phenomenology from the Advaitin standpoint. He questioned the all pervasive 'intentionality’ of consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology on the question of the nature of consciousness in a dreamless sleep state [pp. 10-11]. In this state neither the directedness of consciousness nor the absence of consciousness are present This, as a problem, was overlooked and not answered by Western phenomenologist’s present at the conference. All Indian philosophical systems accept vishaya of vakya, .or jnana or buddhi depending on this or that system but not object directedness of alma (or chit). This holds even for the anatmavadin Buddhist. But, Husserlian consciousness is always consciousness-of. The Western term consciousness needs to be, therefore, disambiguated before it can be used in the context of Indian philosophy.

Advaita argues for atma as sakshi (witness) to understand consciousness in a dreamless sleep 'state. The notion of sakshi refuses the problem of non-identity of ego and consciousness and the logical impasse invoked by the atma being both subject and object in a cognition such as T know I am'. These arguments do indicate the non-finality of the 'transcendental ego' and suggest that intentionality is not essential (svabhavika), but only adventitious (aupadhika) to consciousness [p.ll]. This is a strong claim but Mohanty summarily dismissed it saying that he sees no need to posit an Advaitin consciousness in excess of the self-suflicicnt Husserlian transcendental ego. Mohanty obviously chose to overlook Balasubramanian's dreamless sleep state argument. Another unanswered query of Balasubramanian was - How does phenomenology tackle plurality of consciousness? This is a familiar philosophical issue in Indian philosophy but perhaps a non-issue in the European Christian tradition. In fact, comparative discourse truly begins at a point where reflections on why non-issues are issues in one tradition, and vice versa, are seriously undertaken.

Iso Kern in "Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act According to the 'Vijnapiimatratasiddhr of Xuanzang" suggested that the 'occidental phenomenologist may find here (Vijnanavadin Buddhist)... "universal" verification of his own insights and he may be stimulated to consider new questions and answers' [p.l]. He based his analysis on the Chinese commentary of Xuanzang (Chen wei shi lun) and its super commentary by Kuiji (632-682) on Vasubandhu's 'Trimsika Vtjnaptimatrata-siddhC (Thirty verses on the doctrine of mere consciousness). According to Kern, Xuanzang's analysis of the objectivating act (Vijnaptikriya) shares with phenomenology the insight into the constitutive character of knowledge and on the unacceptability of an object separated from or outside of consciousness [p.4-8]. Kern finds Xuanzang's notion of bija (contained in the deepest level of consciousness, the eighth consciousness, alayavijnana or mulavijnan) analogous to Husserl's sedimentations of the history of a given stream of consciousness [p.7J. Further, the evolution of bija as hetu parinama (evolving at the level of cause) and phalaparinama (evolving at the level of effect: habits etc.) are found to be analogous to Husserl's static constitution (the appearance of the object through the multiplicity of acts) and genetic constitution (becoming of mental habitude) [p.8]. However, the shared insights end here as soon as we situate Xuanzang's analysis in the context of the Buddhist notion of moksa (liberation) and karma siddhanta (principle of rebirth).

The bija in rnulavijnana are of two kinds - (i) nisyanda (seeds of similar continuation, Le., seeds whose causes are similar to their effects like the ones involved in objective cognition, habituation, learning etc) and (ii) vipaka" (seeds of different ripening, i.e., seeds whose effects or fruits are different from their causes like the ones which are involved in the retribution of our former deeds or even the constitution of our physical bodies). These second kind of seeds are karma bija. After death the ego, depending on the kinds of karma bija, embodies accordingly in future births. This cycle of births continues until the ego is dissolved or liberation (nirvana) is achieved. Not only knowledge, but, the body is constituted here. In fact the doctrine of 'mere consciousness' proposes that there is no radical distinction between knowledge and body. Factuality (like that of the body) and morality (like that of deeds) are tied together in karma bija. The obsessive concern with transparent intentionality in phenomenology hardly leaves scope for a coherent philosophy of the body and sensory fields. This was amply illustrated by the confused paper "Merleau-Ponty, Transcendental Imagination, and the Body Schema: on the De-lineation of the Visible". In fact, several 'strange' questions addressed to phenomenologist’s, whose answers could not even be expected, also illustrate the impossibility of an adequate phenomenology of the body. Advaitins had asked what happens to the transcendental ego at death and after death? Does it die? There was a little feminist query from Anandita about the gender of the transcendental ego.

Therefore, Iso Kern's plea that phenomenologists learn from the treasure house of vijnanavada [p. 12], specially its theory of karma, to account for phenomena that cannot be explained by the concept of habitude seemed apposite. But while this suggestion might enrich phenomenology it would also transform transcendental phenomenology beyond recognition. Kern's suggestion, then, pictures vijnanavada as a kind of pure phenomenology in respect of the Husserlian variety with the added content of karma siddhanta. However, the paper falls short of an incisive analysis of those premises of phenomenology that commits it to a situation where its discourse lacks an adequate phenomenology of the body.

It must be noted here that the difference between pure phenomenology and vijnanavada is much more pervasive and deep. The telos of 'eidos ego' in phenomenology derives from a distinct teleological impulse specific to the Graeco-European civilization that does not obtain in Indian traditions. Besides, vijnanavada will find unacceptable the apodicticity of passive constitution or original evidence and pregivenness as well as the eidetic necessity of passive constitution.1 The phenomenological neutrality of hyletic data gets questioned since even that is constituted by the currency of either same (like humans) or different (like cats and human) karma sarira-s. The hetuparinama of bija is not strictly interpretable as static constitution, characterizing eidetic necessity given apodictically as original evidence. This difference has to do with the Graeco-European notion of Form (which is refunded by pure phenomenology in variance with the classical foundation of Form found in platonic realism) and it is this very notion which is hardly found in Indian philosophies including vijnanavada. In vijnanavada the bija sarira resident in rnulavijnana is ultimately dispensable in the process of attaining nirvana. This implies a non-recognition of the apodicticity and self-givenness 6f the eidos structures, in consciousness. Fallibility of Form in vijnanavada must be necessarily intrinsic in order that the ultimate dissolution of bija sarira is possible. Thus, idealities such as a proposition, set or Turing machine are not constituents given apodictically but only evidenced in consciousness as constituents of sanskara sarira prevalent in a particular sahskrti or civilisation. Apodicticity of Form, irrespective of its 'cultural' content, which Husserlians would happily ‘grant',(4) is unacceptable to vijnanavadins and can only be considered a civilization faith that constitutes the Graeco-European theoretical endeavor.

Iso Kern's critique of the notion of intentionality, central to transcendental phenomenology* does not lead him to depart from its terrain. The discursive limits of phenomenology are not really seen for what they are. Kern, like Mohanty, assumes the centrality of phenomenology as a philosophical tradition. Now, this tradition gathers force from Parmenides' famous formulations on the identity of being (einai) and thinking (noein). This Parmenidian principle has been variously interpreted from Plato onwards by several philosophers in the Western tradition, including Husserl and Heidegger, to yield mutually antagonistic philosophical systems (like Platonic vs. Husserlian or even Heideggerian vs. 'metaphysics of presence' which includes the Platonic and Husserlian systems). However, it seems obvious that even these mutually antagonistic systems are caught in a structural bind that locks their formulations within the theses of identity and "sameness".

Husserl used two concepts to understand phenomenon, namely, noema and noesis. Noema are objects that obtains in consciousness and noesis the intentional agency, the thetic or projecting process that actively appropriates or explores the noematic structure of the object. The match of the two, noema-noesis, is fundamental for the phenomenological investigation of noemata through the study of corresponding noeses. This sense of a correspondence and a match that 'presuppositionless' phenomenology invokes can be considered as a return of the ancient Parmenidian metaphysical principle.

Patrick A. Heelan's "Experiment and the 'Fulfillment of Theory" invoked the Husserlian interpretation of Parmenidian principle to fruitfully extend the scope of phenomenological inquiry into a challenging traditional domain of Western analytical philosophy, namely, theory-experiment relation in quantum mechanics and other areas of modern science. Paulos Mar Gregories' "Phenomenology and the Transcendent: Which Way does one Transcend?" singled out the Husserlian interpretation of the Parmenidian principle to evaluate it in the context of Dignaga and Heidegger.

Heelan, while investigating scientific phenomenon, renders the noema-noesis match between objective invariance of noema and subjective invariance of noesis mathematically as the 'common abstract transformation group' [p.4-5]. Any object, for instance my pen, reveals various profiles while undergoing translation and rotation; simultaneously I get various perspective profiles through translation and rotation of the agency, i.e., myself. Both processes emulate ('represent' in the mathematical sense) the invariant of a common abstract transformation group [p.4] (5) The invariant of a common abstract transformation group represents the Parmenidian identity. But does a common abstract transformation group exist for various noema-noesis pairs and would the Parmenidian principle even hold in such an instance? For instance, temporal transformations would violate the match and, hence, an abstract transformation group cannot be formulated in the case of temporal transformations; because the self-identity of noemata cannot be sustained through temporal transformations. Temporality is deeply antithetical to Form, as such, and the idea of Form follows from Husserl's interpretations of the Parmenidian principle. The point here is that the Parmenidian principle is tacitly presumed and operates in Heelan's extension of pure phenomenology. It discloses and conceals its presence thus, simultaneously, to re-affirm its own civilization faith.

Mar Gregorios, on the other hand, is critical of the Husserlian interpretation of the Parmenidian principle on the ground that the presence of an inexhaustible fund of noemata in consciousness is not apodictically self evident [p.7], and since it is eidetic, its' correspondence with the real object is questionable and indefensible. He particularly picks up, as an instance, the noema of God [p. 11] which, according to Husserl, is 'the ideal representative of absolute knowledge (Husserl, Ideas, p.41S) and has to be structurally the same as knowing man or the transcendental subject. The givenness through appearances of the noema of God as an idealised human being is doubtful, and ascribing to it apodictic self-evidence an equally doubtful act. Gregorios suggests that it is Husserl's insistence on 'givenness through appearances' which restricts his transcendentalism and whatever he is able to arrive at through the three otherwise impressive methodological reductions, including his idea of God. Thus, Husserl's method is incapable of apprehending the radically transcendent [p. 12], namely, the point where consciousness as conscionsness-of is itself transcended [p. 14], such as in the state of nirvana or moksa. This corroborates well with Balasubramanian's point about the non-finality of transcendental ego.

The Husserlian obsession with appearances ('presence') is founded on the assumption that the real object has the same structural composition as the eidetic or noematic object [p. 16]. Noema is composed of a nucleus ‘x’ around which cluster certain predicates or properties or qualities. The real object is also composed of a nucleus V holding together certain predicates. The nucleus of noemata and the real object might be different, but since' meaning and content only deal with predicates, the tic or intentional act intuits the entire meaning of the external object in terms of its set of predicates as given in the noemata. Husserl calls both nuclei an 'empty x’ [p. 10]. Through this move the identity of thinking and being is refounded. This is where the Parmenidian principle is assumed. Through this move the identity of eidetic noemata and the real is tacitly upheld. This identity forces down the conception of noemata as a bundle of all meanings copulated to the nucleus given at once, though a particular thetic act might evidence only a perspective sense of an object at a time. The perspective sense in a particular thetic act is resolvable through abstract transformations covering all possible perspectives as complete meaning or as noemata. The identity of the structural compositions of the real and the noemata founds perspective appearances as sense structures and, in return, is founded all given’s through appearances. The reduction of consciousness as consciousness-off is possible through a tacit identity of the structural compositions of the real and the noemata.

Gregories cites Dignaga's (Sth century AD) view on pratyaksha (sense perception) and anumana (inference) from 'Pramana Samaccaya' to contest the Husserlian version of the old Parmenidian problematic. According to Dignaga, this identity of being and thinking would be based on adhyavasaya or false identification [p. 19). Dignaga makes a radical distinction between vastu and real externality, which activates sense-impressions, and cognition, which is construed as it is, because of the karma (vasana) sarira. The vastu itself has its own svalaksana, which is unique, particular and distinct from everything else (sarvato-vyavrtta), a momentary point, an instant (kshanika), without extension or duration and is beyond quanficand-qualification relation (viseshya-viseshana-bhavanavagahi). Cognition, on the other hand, construes universals and objects in a complex of relations through inferential procedures. The real object, in this instance, has neither a nucleus nor qualifying predicates [p. 19]. The Parmenidian identity will simply not obtain here. Dignaga's approach is an instance from the Indian philosophical tradition which helps us situate the limits of phenomenological enquiry. Such instances are abundantly present in the Indian philosophical tradition.

It is clear that Mar Gregorios has drawn much of his critique of Husserl from Heidegger, a rebellious student of Husserl and an irritant for Husserlians. Heidegger has developed a radical critique of the identity of being and thinking as is epitomized in the various interpretations of the Parmenidian principle since Plato (in his 'Identity and Difference'). He has clubbed all these attempts, including Husserl's, as instituting’metaphysics of presence'. Heidegger's original insight is that the identity of being and thinking conceals the origin of and the disclosure of being as well as thinking. The postulation of identity creates a self-same transparency of being and does not help in installing 'difference' as a category. The always-already givenness of the entirety of beings mystifies and defers an enquiry into the origin of beings and constructs artificial defences to conceal the problem of origins and thereby, institutes a 'metaphysics of presence*. The identity of being and thinking stems from not considering the 'ontological difference' between Being and beings. The presence of the fund of noemata that make possible the thetic act and the givenness of noema in appearances both arise from the prejudice of 'presence' founded through the identity of being and thinking. (Jacques Derrida, a contemporary Western thinker has extended this Heideggerian insight to focus on the fallacy of 'presence' as embodied in the notion of form as such).

However Megger's critique of Husserl is fundamentally different from the tacit critique implied in the work of Dignaga and taken up by Gregories. Here, the foregrounding of two different critical assumptions can only be seen as the beginnings of comparative enquiry. Heidegger's reinterpretation of the Parmenidian principle (in his 'Identity and Difference', p.27), by introducing 'ontological difference' between Being and beings does lead him out of the closure of 'presence' but still confines him within the systemic domain of the third person temporally indefinite Greek verb on ('to be') and its synonyms. This verb on still remains as a secure fulcrum in which is delimited thinking as well as reality as ‘on-to-logy’, with the charge, now, of 'difference (ontological)' added to it. This insightful 'difference' is a result of Heidegger's emphasis on the active sense of the infinitive 'to be’. Heidegger's etymological equipment is so narrow compared to Yaska's (a 6th century BC etymologist regarded as an uthority in the Indian tradition) that he cannot theorise the opposition of bhu- (bhava: happening, becoming) and as- (satta: being) ('Nirukta' 1.1.7). Instead, he theorises an opposition between to eon (the Being) and esti outo (what is there as same, self-identical or being.) According to Yaska ('Nirukta' 1.2), asti (being) is only one of the vikara (modification or expression) of bhava among the six vikara-s, and, if inflated as a philosophical pivot (as in on-to-logy) it would play a role of concealment of bhava pradhanata (primacy of bhava) and its other modifications. It will not only restrict the apparatus of verbs as such in analysis (the most stark example can be found in modem formal languages) but would also not be able to deconstruct the implied concealment of bhava. In this sense, the narrowness of Heidegger's enterprise lies in his not being able to rise above the apparatus of the Greek verb on (and its synonyms). He, therefore, theorizes a restricted critique of the metaphysics of 'presence’ and as a result ends. Up with a discourse of withdrawal and dispossession. True, Heidegger's nonconstructive conversation with the Graeco-European tradition helps demonstrate certain limits of the Graeco-European tradition, including that of Husserl, but he offers little by way of transforming the destiny of the same tradition.

There can hardly be, therefore, a serious philosophical affinity between Heidegger and Dignaga, given Heidegger's faith in the apparatus of the verb on and Dignaga's preoccupation with the apparatus of the verbal root ma- (measuring, knowing) (as in pram ana, prama, prameya, anumana etc.) Dignaga's project of demarcating authentic and errorfull knowledge to pave way for the quest of nirvana and mindful righteous action (dharma) is not concerned with ontology. Indeed, it aids us in unmasking questions of ontological import so central,to the Western philosophical tradition and its epistemology. The notion of vastu as radically external to cognitive acts serves to define, here, the path of action. Heidegger, concerned as he is with the pivotal on, from the Greek, does not rupture the limits of ontology. He is unable to suspend this opaque ultimate rationality, so endemic to the Graeco-Roman tradition. Phenomenology, ironically enough, is imprisoned by what it seeks to escape.

At this point we will return to Mohant’s insights into the Indian philosophical tradition
(Sic. the concept of rationality) especially with regard to the Universalist stance of transcendental phenomenology. This Universalist stance derives its authority from a so-called 'ontology-free' phenomenology, free from 'psychologism' and 'metaphysical speculation'. The term on-to-logy in our usage (which we believe is an insightful usage) is to be understood in the strict context of the Parmenidian principle, along with the various meanings of 'to be' such' as the existential, copulative, veridical, judicative or even the active sense. The positing of a fund of noemata, even as idealities or unrealities, means fulfilling an on-to-logical (on is to be understood in a judicative sense) requirement. It is a result of anthologizing (morpheme on is to be taken not merely in existential sense) of experience; only three methodological reductions are made to yield a self-transparent theory of constitution. It is, thus, a predicative on-to-logy of apodictive givenness which forms elements of the theory of constitution. This anthologizing impulse in phenomenology is, as Heidegger noted, a consequence of its own civilization faith in 'pure' Form. While Heidegger came close to demonstrating the complicity of the 'metaphysics of presence' with the notion of Form, he himself never completely abandoned it. It is, in this context, that one ought to consider Mohant’s dilemmas over Indian philosophy's refusal of certain issues pertinent to the Graeco-European tradition. For, the limits of the latter should suggest a creative inquiry into the former.

It is the reductivism of the Parmenidian principle which splits up relations as de re (causal) and de dictb (logical) in a residual and irreconcilable fashion. It is no wonder then, that Mohanty is surprised by pramana sastra - It appears, then, as though these thinkers (Indians) solved the problem that has led to much quandary in Western thinking; the problem namely, of, how to relate the two spaces - the causal space and the logical space [p. 5]. It needs to be added that this, 'problezri' was never discovered or never was the need felt to articulate it in the Indian tradition. Rather, one can witness abundantly the redundancy of this 'problem' in various schools of philosophy cin the Indian tradition. Mohanty, of course, takes note of this fundamental difference between Husserlian thinking and Indian philosophy. This difference, exists, however not merely with Husserlian thought but with the larger Graeco-European tradition of epistemology and logic The pertinent issue which awaits resolution, then, is - does pramana sastra limit the ideality of the logical and the contingency of the casual' [p. 11] in a detrimental manner, a manner that leads to inaction or harmful action or whether pramana sastra refuses the Graeco-European impasse that can only be resolved by constructing runaway idealities or feticides contingencies.

First of all, we have to see this refusal of a schism between causal and logical spaces in the larger context of certain key tenets of Indian philosophy vis-a-vis the Graeco-European tradition. These are, the absence of the idea of proposition, absence of the distinction between truth and validity, absence of the distinction between sense and reference, absence of the distinction between contingent and necessary, absence of deductive inference, absence of the theory of modalities, absence of formal logic etc These tenets signify the absence of the notion of pure Form in Indian intellectual endeavours. They signify 'negatively because they point towards an absence in the Indian tradition of certain distinctions and concepts which occupy a central position in Graeco-European theoretical endeavours. There is very little scholarship which strives to articulate the silences in the Graeco-European tradition from the perspective of the Indian tradition. Hence, the negative significations of the Indian tradition testify more to the hegemonic instance of the Graeco-European tradition than to the failure of Indian philosophy as such:

When Mohanty says that ‘their (Indian) theory of meaning being, generally speaking, a referential theory (except the apoha theory and some version of sphota theory)' [p.7]he is commenting hegemonicaUy on a certain absence, the absence of a distinction between sense and reference in the Indian tradition.

The Fregeian distinction between sense and reference, between F and x of a proposition F(x) is originally situated within the formal concept of a proposition (a result of a refinement of the Aristotelian copulated proposition by Port Royal logicians). Thus meaning would deal only with predication F or sense. Husserl is able to reduce the importance of the Aristotelian disjunction between predicate and object by making the object empty with the device of the noemata. The thetic act, constituted as a unity of thinking and being, also helps focus on the sense structure or meaning. Mohanty does not situate Husserl's theory of meaning as a specific theoretical act within the tradition that contains as a basic premise the concept of proposition and the Parmenidian principle. For, it is only within this context, that a sense theory or reference theory of meaning can be .made. Thus, to classify most of the Indian theories of meaning as referential or non-referential is a theoretically naive move, since it means taking for granted the notion of proposition and the Parmenidian principle. Vyakarna tradition, which accepts bhava pradhanata or the centrality of the verb in a unit of cognition defies object predicate distinction and, moreover, preferentiality of a verb is a contradiction in terms. The theory of meaning in the Vyakarna tradition (including sphota theory) does not allow us to state a distinction between sense theory and reference theory. Similarly, with the. Mimamsa tradition which accepts the centrality of verbal endings and bhavana pradhanata. Classically, in the West, a referential theory of meaning would be a theory of names and classes to which pronouns refer. In that sense, one could loosely call apoha theory as nominal’s since each entity is constructed through infantry distancing from the rest and this procedural syntax can be called a naming syntax. Even the compatibility of entities as entities (e.g., sentence) is constructed through the same syntax. Such an interpretation would indicate that apoha theory is a nominal’s theory and hence a referential theory rather than a sense theory. Moreover, this syntax does not yield a privileged form of proposition so that one could locate a referential or sense component of meaning. Besides, we have seen earlier that Buddhists do not accept the Parmenidian principle with the help of which Husserl could delineate sense structure from what is popularly understood as.a referential meaning. The Buddhist belief in sanikatva of external reality gives the impression that apoha meanings are constructions, in the sense of predications, and hence the apoha theory is a sense theory of meaning. The point being made here is that the distinction between sense and reference and its background apparatus provides only indeterminate criteria for classifying Indian theories of meaning as sense or reference theories. Such indeterminate criteria will not be able to yield a determinate understanding of Indian theories of meaning.

Mdhanty's comments, once again, reveal the discursive limits of the West when he refers to Indian philosophy's 'ontolomcalfy oriented mode of thinking' [p.10]. This comment is significant, since it shows phenomenology projecting its own distrust of ontology on to Indian philosophy. Mohanty uses the term ontology to mean the theory of the thing itself as opposed to the theory of the constitution of sense. Perhaps, the morpheme on of on-to-logy is taken in its existential meaning. Such a usage does not help Mohanty take note of judicative ontology in pure
phenomenology (for instance, that of noemata and apodictive givenness in general) and makes ontology a polemical term through which pure phenomenology distances itself from other philosophies. That is why the phrase 'ontologically oriented mode of thinking' is bound to signify ambiguously. We have used the term ontology in the determinate context of the Parmenidian principle. This, we believe has historical and philosophical merit. In our sense of the term there is no question of an 'ontologically oriented mode of thinking' in the Indian philosophical tradition. Our usage of the term is narrow but determinate compared to the popular usage of the term. If one is to be taken in its existential sense alone then ontology would be a theory of the objects of a' proposition or a theory of the referents of predicates. Then, the sense of the term ontology would be narrower still but determinate. Thus our usage of the term ontology and phenomenology could be called ontology-free since the existential object is, anyway, rendered empty by phenomenology. Thus, the phrase 'ontologically oriented mode of thinking' would not describe even fragments of the Indian philosophical tradition. For, neither the theory of padartha-s of Vaiseshika-Nyaya, nor the theory of tattva-s of Sankhya-Yoga, nor the theory of dravya-paryaya of Jains would qualify as ontologies since they do not constitute the theory of referents of predicates. Rather, they implicate predicates within their structure or more exactly, they defy the idea of proposition as an object being copulated with meaning or sense. They are simply not the theories of beings known through the authority (copulative, judicative or other) of the verb on and its synonyms. In fact, Indian theories help us unask questions regarding ontology posed by transcendental phenomenology.

The sense/reference distinction Mohanty insists on only serves to confuse his understanding in a particular instance, that of sabda pramana. In the theory of sabda pramana, sense, as grasped in understanding the utterance of others, is taken as amounting to knowing that something is the case, which is a matter of reference, since it is reference which is grasped in knowing as distinct from mere understanding [p. 16]. This violation of sense/reference distinction, which, after all, even Mohanty has to acknowledge, sustains a modernist impression that 'at worst it (the theory of sabda pramana) appears to be a device to justify scriptures, at its best it amounts to stopping the process of critical enquiry by appealing to the competence, and noble intentions, of the speaker or of the author' [p. 15]. It is here that matters turn out to be political. If one accepts the authority of sense/reference distinction and its presuppositions one can force an interpretation of other discourses accordingly through an intellectual exercise, but if the authority of the distinction is seen to be violated, then the terms of discourse become overtly political. Here Mohanty takes an unexpected turn. After all sabda pramana deals with matters moral, political and spiritual and not merely empirical matters. Moral rules are learnt 'only through reading/hearing and interpreting verbal instructions'. Even 'if an accepted set of moral rules is given up, it is given up by imbibing another set of moral rules on the basis of another set of verbal instructions. In this case sabda amends sabda, much as perceptual error is corrected by another perception' [p. 17], In this moment of faltering authority of .pure phenomenology Mohanty wonders: "whether we need to distinguish between sense (which is grasped in mere understanding of a sentence) and reference (which is grasped in knowing), there are domains such as moral rules where it is through interpreting linguistic discourse (and not through any further empirical verification) that one determines what one ought or ought not to do' [p. 16]. Sense/ reference distinction with its defensive paraphernalia seems to falter here and Mohanty conveniently invokes the authority of hermenutic phenomenology to deal with sabda and makes the point that a text does not have a monolithic interpretation but leaves room for interpretative differences as well as for possibilities of new interpretations. This hermenutical detour helps Mohanty in overcoming the impasse the sense/reference distinction is forced into, in the case of moral laws. However, as an evaluative critique of sabda pramana this move reduces the import of sabda as a concept and brings it under the authority of Western hermenutics.

Such a hermenutical exercise confuses the understanding of particular texts and instances of sabda as was clear from J.L. Mehta's "Reading the Rgveda: A Phenomenological essay", where he draws authority from modern Western hermenutics in an attempt to 'interpret' the 'text' of the Rgveda. According to him in India the 'exegesis was from the beginning geared to the perspective of the use of the Vedic mantras for ritual purpose, without much concern for the understanding of the text by itself, as autonomous and constituting a coherent world of meanings' fp. 24]. Rgveda in this tradition was never 'read' but used is his claim. With modern Hermenutics the time has, now, come to read the Rgveda Samhita. Mehta tries to give a Heideggerian (inspired also by Gadamer and Ricoeur) 'reading' of the text of the Rgveda. Mehta makes an interesting critique of Luder's interpretation of Rta as truth, since according to his analysis it is a hegemonic interpretation based on the correspondence theory of truth presupposed in the Western metaphysical tradition. Instead, he proposes an interpretation of Rta as aletheia (personified Goddess of truth in Parmenides' poem) in the technical sense of Heidegger fp. 25]. He attempts to draw a wedge, thus, between action, reduced by him to use, and interpretation. Oblivious of the Mimamsa tradition of exegises based on the actional theory of interpretation, he dogmatically accepts the wedge. The artificiality of the wedge merely mystifies the relationship of authority with interpretation and action and allows one to indulge in an interpretative game with beginnings and ends mystified. The hermenutic circle closes on itself, hermenutical phenomenology asserts itself and questions of authority as they inhere in the Indian text are deferred.

More significant, however, in this context are Mohanty's two interrelated proposals that he advances as philosophical tasks for Indian philosophy. These are:

1) 'One cannot prima facie rule out sabda, but has to question, from within the tradition of Indian philosophy if it deserves a place in the list of pramana-s' [p. 16].

2) 'the laying bare of the rationality of our (Indian) beliefs and cognition, of moral rules and artistic creations, confronts, in Indian thought, an absolute limit. The pramana-s "establish" them, the consciousness evidences this act of establishment, but the judicative authority of ihc pramana-s is not, and cannot be traced back to their origin in the structure of that consciousness. What, then, is the source of their authority?' [p. 19]. 'Whcrcfrom does a school, Nyaya or Samkhya or Vedanta or any other, derive its basic concepts, its list ofprumana-s which it so vehemently defends? This limit to rationality was operative but never thematised by the Indian philosophers. Now is the occasion to thematise it, and thereby to press relentlessly towards the ground that supports the alternate conceptualization’s [p. 20].

Both these projects are outlined as part of a determined effort to disambiguate the theoretical implications that inhere in sabda. It is in the domain of sabda that 'the issues of authority are raised in Indian philosophies. On the one hand, one encounters an opacity when sources of judicative authority of the pramana-s is sought. On the other hand, one runs into an equal opacity when sabda is assigned the status of a pramana. There is this circularity which makes the Indian philosophical tradition apparently opaque. Both projects suggested by Mohanty are construed around the same plea - to thematise this opacity and transgress its limits. The opacity has to be understood in contradistinction from what Husserl called 'self- transparent omniscience in hand1. The plea is to regain hermenutic transparency by foregrounding the original text (the source of authority) from where interpretative departures, as supposedly
epitomized in classical Indian philosophical schools, can be understood and further fresh
departures can be construed.

The Graeco-European philosophical tradition presumes a transparency of knowing, in this instance, a transparency that is seen to reside in a "root" text that also inheres in other, subsequent texts-in one form or the other. It is this transparency which bestows such a pan-historical confidence in Western philosophers that Hegel could confidently declare his philosophy as the last philosophy, as .the fulfillment of the original text or- Husserl could declare that, with him, ends the era of pre-scientific philosophy and that his is the first philosophy or even Heidegger could declare the end of metaphysics and the beginning of true thinking with his philosophy. Similar attitudes can be traced even in Newton and in Marx. All these thinkers confidently declare their own departures as final departures, as the final fulfillment of the "original" text or the original enterprise of 'philosophy’ as inaugurated by the Graeco-European civilization. For each of these thinkers all earlier philosophical endeavours in their tradition prior to their decisive intervention were mistaken interpretations of. the text. For instance, Husserl reads the'root authoritarian text of Graeco-European civilization as 'presupposition less self-transparent omniscience in hand* and seeks to fulfill it in phenomenology. This hermenutical disposition presumes the presence of an authoritative commanding text which fixes the quest and is rationally mterpretable and around which is involutes the quest of philosophy. Projects such as those suggested by Mohanty stem from such a hermenutical disposition.

But such a hermenutics makes sense only in a universe that is seen as having beginnings and ends. The Graeco-European hermenutical disposition is rooted in a thesis of origins in the sense of a historical project as well as in the thesis of an ending in the sense of a finally fulfilled authoritative text. This adi-anta bhava as a civilization disposition is radically different from the anadi-anarita bhava (beginning less-endless disposition) as a civilization disposition. Adi-anta .disposition can situate judicative authority in the original self-transparent text but what does it mean to found authority in a tradition which internalizes no beginning and no end? I think this is the basic question that enables us unmask old questions of Indian philosophies and perhaps other non-Graeco-European philosophies. If there is no beginning and no end what would be the purpose of life (or for that matter even that of srshti) or on what ground would manners and morals be instituted or on what fulcrum would rest the possibility of determinate action or how could sureness in knowledge be founded? Will not determinateness, definitiveness, security and directedness (purpose) crumble up in the womb of a beguiningless endless disposition? Will it not mean the return of apeiron (infinity, indefiniteness) so dreaded by the Greek philosophers? How these queries are resolved in various ways can be witnessed in the sophistications and subtleties of Indian philosophies. Indian civilisation does not offer an origin, the text, an ab initio ground for the rational resolution of life, given its. anadi-ananta disposition, To demand it from Indian philosophy is to force its mutilation. The Indian notion of sabda pramana is, of necessity, situated within the anadi-ananta disposition in an attempt to found authority. The anadi-ananta disposition is intimately related to the thesis of anadibandhatva (begjnningless bondage), to the ideal of moksa or nirvana (liberation), to the theory of.kannasiddhanta and to the notion of sabda. These are some of the unique features enshrined in Indian philosophies and must be reckoned with in any comparative endeavor. The appraisal of sabda pramana by embedding it in the adi-anta disposition is bound to be a reductive appraisal and will only refound the notion of sabda along the lines of Western hermenutics and its status as pramana, would thus, be lost.

The pramanatva of sabda directly cuts into the possibility of "self-transparent omniscience in hand" implied by the notion of a root text arid in the project of a transparent rational resolution of an ab initio ground. It is no wonder, then, that Mohanty issues a call for the re-examination of the place of sabda in the list of pramatia-s (sic, ‘from within the tradition of Indian philosophy'). For, the rational criteria ('critical norm') for sabda amending or correcting sabda cannot be founded. For that matter, even the rational authority (or self transparent critical norms) of pramana-s in general can also not be instituted. The ultimate dependence of pramana-s on their ability to generate.successful action (saphalapravrttijanakatva) would lead to opacity if rational limits to this dependence are sought. Saphalakriya itself is normatively dependent on the judgment about successful result which itself would depend on dharmartha, a matter of sabda. These dependencies give the impression of opacity, largely because action itself is seen as an opaque limit of 'rationality’ and a theory of successful action is an 'irrational' impossibility. The contestable issue is - can these dependencies be rationally resolved to yield a 'self transparent omniscience in hand' or an authoritative text as demanded by the Graeco-European philosophical and hermenutical traditions? This is exactly the task that Mohanty advances for contemporary Indian philosophy. Why it is that such a task was never undertaken by the Indian philosophers? Could it be that the notion of 'rationality itself is an ethnocentric and limited notion and cannot be used as a constant category in a comparative discourse? If the 'reliability’ of actions is not decisively defined how can the notion of 'rationality’ adjudicate over the claims of a theory of moral action?

But let us consider the other extreme option: What if questions of authority and rationality are not raised at all? What is at stake if pramanatva of sabda is withheld? The instituted manners and morals in Indian civilization on the basis of the sabda pramana would stand unauthenticated. The authority of a particular civilisational disposition and faith which is philosophically founded through the theory of sabda pramana would be nullified. Besides, such a move would mystify the determinate workings of authority in general (even authority enshrined and commandeered within the Graeco-European tradition) and evade the issue of political hegemony. Sabda pramana ensures jural autonomy of each within the anadi-ananta disposition which, if suspended, would lead to, either the reign of arbitrary positive law hopping from crises to crises in-accordance with the will of the sovereign authority, or an imposition of text Christianized as 'natural' law, or as a source of authority.

The theory of sabda pramana is then, not merely a device to ensure openness in an interpretative enterprise (the ultimate 'either-or' [p.20], but a theory of determinate moral action making possible the quest of life, purusartha, embedded within the anandi-ananta disposition. The theory of sabda pramana within the background of anadi-ananta disposition founds authority (jural as well as epistemic) as apaurusheya, as prior to life or constitutive of life or more exactly as primordial disposition of life. The apaurusheya sabda is not a text nor is the enterprise of Darsana Sastra an interpretative enterprise of that text. It is loka siddha (established in the people at large) and accessible as sruti (heard) to each jiva (life form). It is the words of elders, of trusted and dependable persons, of epics, of recalled episodes, of recalled feats. The concept of apaurusheya sabda makes possible an understanding of the primordial jurally situation of life as well as primordial jural disposition of fife. The distinction between dharma-adharma is founded by apaurusheyatva and is realised in feats or successful actions or saphalakarya. All right cognitions and norms of distinction between error-free or error full cognition are eventually resolved in feats as distinct from facts or reasons. It is in feats that the alleged distinction between knowledge and action is resolved. Without the pramanatva of sabda, feats will not be possible as the distinction between dharma and adharma will not be realisable. Apaurusheya sruti founds life's faith in feats in which is resolvable dharamartha, a condition for the ultimate quest of life, purusartha. One cannot but more than agree with the final apprehensive words of Mohanty regarding originary ground in Indian philosophies-'... if we can find anything but.... the words of apaurusheya sruti'.

One cannot, then, transpose, without a risk of losing comparative ground, the idea of ratio-ability and its residual consequences for interpreting other philosophical traditions which did not install or institute self-transparent ratio-ability in their endeavours. The apparent opacity of sabda pramana is a result of this transposition, a residual consequence of 'reading' ratio-ability or ratiocination in the Indian philosophies. Such a transposition would .be justified if self-transparent ratio-ability can be shown to be implicitly instituted in Indian philosophies and only, in that case, definite projects on the basis of its authority can be authentically advanced. On the other hand, there is sufficient prima facie evidence to suspect deep problems with the idea of a self-transparent ratio-ability from the perspectives of Indian philosophies and to press for a concrete and determinate project to deconstruct the idea in its various ramifications in the Graeco-European philosophies. The popular and often enough polemical term 'rationality’ needs to be disambiguated by foregrounding its prejudgments, presuppositions and supportive paraphernalia so that the authenticity of its transposition can at least be evaluated and moreover, if need be, its absolutist features or limits can be delineated.

In fact, at this juncture, an important task for the Indian philosophical tradition is to develop a stance from within to overcome these hegemonic transpositions which invariably lead to a residual relativism. To develop such a stance one will have to domesticate major traditions of the Graeco-European philosophies; a task which requires a development of their critique and an appropriation of their absolutist features, limits and horizon from the standpoints of Indian philosophies. Only such a task would open the possibility of a non-hegemonic discourse across traditions. The successful feats in logic and mathematics founded on the Graeco-European idea of self-transparent ratio-ability or form will have to be deconstructed in order to advance foundations of lope, linguistics and mathematics from the standpoint of Indian theoretical endeavors.

It must be said here that critiques of phenomenology from within the Western philosophical traditions are not entirely absent. Apart from Heidegger, both Theodor Adorho and Jacques Derrida, and, to an extent, Jacques Lacan have consistently questioned the central notions of phenomenology, especially, the concept of thetic intentionality and of a transcendental subject that arches over material reality and the notion of pure form.

This tradition of critique owes much to Nietzsche, to whom Adorno, Derrida and Heidegger are indebted in different ways. The context of these critiques has been the intellectual debates concerning the "rationality" of Western civilization itself that were spawned in the aftermath of World War I and which came to fruition with the repeal of Reason by the philosophers and writers of the sixties, especially in France. Adorno, in Germany,' had already noted in his doctoral dissertation the problem of temporality with regard to thetic consciousness. Derrida, after Heidegger, carried over the latter's criticism of the 'metaphysics of presence' to a criticism of what has been termed the 'metaphysics of origins'. Both Adorno and Derrida have undermined the thetic unity of consciousness by situating it in time and language respectively. Both temporality and linguistic activity defer meaning and signification and hint at a process that exists in excess of the transcendental consciousness conceived as a unity.

It is not the intention of this essay to detail these various arguments and critiques. It seemed important to advance this information, though especially, since these critiques from within the Western tradition did not figure in the comparative discourse at all. The privileged position accorded phenomenology by Mohanty, in this context, figures as a hegemonic position, constructed and maintained by a politics of knowledge that does not see its own deployment.

It is largely a result of the current weak political state of Indian philosophies that serious discourse across Indian and - Graeco-European philosophical traditions is not possible. Mohanty's attempt in organizing a dialogue at this conference, at least, provided an opportunity to reflect on ways through which comparative discourse can be opened further or ways through which these may be rendered impossible.

The apex moment of the conference was the concluding act when Chairman of CARP, Laster Embree, allegorized Mohanty's role by recalling the small lonely trail which Mohanty had left when years ago he moved from the Indian philosophical world to the West and it is the same trail which his Western colleagues have followed back to this conference. Embree was confident that back and forth traffic on the trail would increase day by day and amidst applause he christened it as the "Mohanty highway". One has to tread cautiously for no highway is good if it drains the composure of home.




Author: Navjyoti Singh